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OF PROPERTY AND INFORMATION 
Abraham Bell * and Gideon Parchomovsky** 
The property–information interface is perhaps the most crucial 
and undertheorized dimension of property law. Information about pro-
perty can make or break property rights. Information about assets and 
property rights can dramatically enhance the value of ownership. Con-
versely, a dearth of information can significantly reduce the benefits 
associated with ownership. It is surprising, therefore, that contemporary 
property theorists do not engage in sustained analysis of the property–
information interface and, in particular, of registries—the repositories 
of information about property. 
Once, things were different. In the past, discussions of registries 
used to be a core topic in property classes and a focal point for property 
scholarship. In recent decades, registries have lost their luster for schol-
ars, and their discussion has been relegated to the innermost pages of 
property textbooks. The reason for this is that registries are widely 
considered the domain of legal practitioners, not of theorists. 
This Essay argues that nothing could be further from the truth. 
Registries and the information they contain are, in fact, the formative 
forces that shape the world of property and no theoretical account of the 
institution of property can be complete without them. In this Essay, we 
offer the first in-depth legal-theoretical analysis of the intricate relation-
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ship among title information, rights, and assets in the domain of prop-
erty, as mediated by registries. 
Our analysis gives rise to several new insights. First, we highlight 
the triple role that registries perform for property owners. They simul-
taneously perform a facilitative role by streamlining transactions be-
tween willing sellers and buyers, an obstructive role by hindering non-
consensual encroachments and takings of assets, and an enabling role 
by allowing owners to locate and use their own lost assets. Second, 
going against the accepted lore, we posit that perfect registries, even if 
they were possible, are socially undesirable on account of what we call 
“the information–asset paradox.” Perfect information about assets and 
legal rights may result in the destruction, dismembering, and mutila-
tion of the asset by nonconsensual takers in an attempt to make the 
asset unrecognizable, as exemplified by millions of stolen cars and jewel-
ry, or, conversely, in attempts of “identity theft” that confer thieves with 
the benefit of the registered rights. Third, we argue that the registries are 
socially desirable when it is impossible or difficult to alter the defining 
characteristic of the underlying asset. This insight explains why there 
are registries for nontransformable assets, such as land and unique art-
works, but not for transformable assets that include mass production 
goods and many natural resources. Finally, we address the question of 
which rights should be covered by registries and how much legal defer-
ence should be given to them. 
The framework we provide is significant not only for theoretical 
reasons but also for practical ones. For example, it can inform policy-
makers in deciding whether to establish new registries for smartphones 
and personal computers in order to combat theft of such devices. Sim-
ilarly, our analysis sounds a cautionary note about the ability of regis-
tries of copyrighted works to curb unlawful appropriation and distri-
bution. Per our analysis, such assets are infinitely malleable and, worse 
yet, information concerning ownership in such works can be easily 
effaced or altered in the digital age. We also discuss how considerations 
of costs and privacy affect the comprehensiveness and integrity of regist-
ries. At the end of the day, our analysis exposes the promise and the 
limitations of registries, as well as the ways in which they can be 
improved by the state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Very few concepts affect our property system as profoundly as 
information about property rights.1 In this Essay, we argue that extant 
theorizing on the property–information interface, while illuminating and 
important, misses essential aspects of the intricate and dynamic relation-
ship between property and information. The Essay seeks to address this 
omission and offer a deeper understanding of how information shapes 
rights and assets in the property domain. 
To date, legal scholarship on the property–information interface has 
primarily focused on three questions. First, most theorists who have 
investigated the interface between information and property rights have 
focused their attention on property rights in information itself. This is 
best evidenced by the vast and ever-growing literature on intellectual 
property (IP) law.2 Secondarily, in the context of standard property law, 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Va. L. Rev. 
465, 468 (2004) [hereinafter Long, Information Costs] (emphasizing significance of mak-
ing observers aware of property rights held by others so they may effectively comply with 
responsibilities saddled on them by creation of right in question); Meredith M. Render, 
Complexity in Property, 81 Tenn. L. Rev. 79, 96–118 (2013) (providing comprehensive 
overview of information-costs thesis propounded by Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith and 
important critiques offered in counter). 
 2. See, e.g., David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The 
America Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 517 (2013) (leveraging 
empirical model to predict impact of America Invents Act on proportion of patents secur-
ed by individual investors); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright Infringement Markets, 
113 Colum. L. Rev. 2277 (2013) (advocating independent market for copyright claims and 
outlining potential benefits of permitting third-party involvement in copyright infringe-
ment claims); Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation–Construction 
Distinction in Patent Law, 123 Yale L.J. 530 (2013) (distinguishing between sources of 
uncertainty in patent claim construction); Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum 
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scholars—most notably Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith,3 as well as 
Clarisa Long4—have examined how the internal design of property 
doctrines and principles convey information to the public at large. 
Finally, and relatedly, some scholars have concentrated on the way vari-
ous doctrines, such as those related to adverse possession, encourage or 
demand that claimants reveal information.5 
None of these bodies of literature address the special role of 
information about title in property. In this Essay, we analyze the value of 
                                                                                                                           
of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 Yale L.J. 1900 (2013) (positing excludability 
in patent rights is asymmetrical for different kinds of information and suggesting alter-
native approaches to property protection are necessary); Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 
121 Yale L.J. 470 (2011) (arguing institutional relationship between Patent Trademark 
Office and Federal Circuit leads to inflationary pressure on patents); Dotan Oliar, The 
Copyright–Innovation Tradeoff: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Intentional Infliction 
of Harm, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 951 (2012) (investigating potential for property rules and 
liability rules to minimize interference between copyright owners and maximize inno-
vators’ incentive to invest); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property 
Defenses, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1483 (2013) (suggesting ways to expand binding pre-
cedential value of individual patent claims and prevent superfluous litigation from 
imposing societal costs); Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 761 
(2013) (suggesting new theoretical framework for evaluating trademark system centered 
on moral obligations between consumers and producers); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond 
Coase: Emerging Technologies and Property Theory, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2189 (2012) 
(examining interdependencies characterizing new technologies and resulting implications 
for choice of property form); Xiyin Tang, Note, The Artist as Brand: Toward a Trademark 
Conception of Moral Rights, 122 Yale L.J. 218 (2012) (arguing artists’ “moral rights” 
benefit public by lowering search costs and increasing efficiency in art markets). 
 3. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 40–42 (2000) [hereinafter 
Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization] (identifying minimization of information costs 
as key rationale guiding numerus clausus principle, and advocating resort to legislature, 
rather than judiciary, as appropriate institutional forum for modifying closed list of 
recognized property interests); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The 
Property/Contract Interface, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 773, 795–96, 801–02 (2001) (arguing in 
rem character of property rights renders rules governing them more rigid due to need to 
furnish information to wider pool of individuals); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property 
Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719, 1753–54 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property Rules] 
(suggesting property rules enjoy advantage over liability rules insofar as they allow 
decentralization of decisionmaking and concomitant reduction of information costs). 
 4. Long, Information Costs, supra note 1, at 480–82 (observing in intellectual 
property context that “[l]egal rules must balance the goal of reduction of information 
costs with other social values” and that best rules “will not always be the ones that make 
transmission of information about the good easy”); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 625, 667–71 (2002) (presenting model of patents as signaling mechanism used 
for conveying information). 
 5. William C. Marra, Adverse Possession, Takings, and the State, 89 U. Det. Mercy L. 
Rev. 1, 14–15 (2011) (arguing deterrence of rent-seeking, by compelling record owner to 
come forward, disclose information, and stake her claim within statute of limitations, is 
one of the more powerful justifications for adverse possession); Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. 
Sirmans, An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession, 15 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 161, 164 
(1995) (describing how time-limited property rules create incentives to uncover and share 
information ex ante). 
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this information and the means of efficiently producing and dissem-
inating it. Our analysis is based on the simple idea that the value of title 
to property rights vitally depends on the degree to which it is known by 
people in the world, including the property owner. 
Knowledge about title to property rights is crucial to enjoying their 
value. If one “owned” an asset, but nobody knew about the ownership, its 
value would be deeply compromised. Buyers would not readily appear, as 
they would not have any information to confirm the title of the seller. 
Third parties might use the asset and even destroy it, believing in good 
faith that it belonged to no one. Owners would sharply constrain uses of 
their asset in order to avoid actions that might be interpreted as compro-
mising their title, and they would expend greater resources on protecting 
their ownership. An owner without knowledge of title would fail to 
exploit the value of the asset. In short, the value of property rights is 
directly affected by the quality of information about title to those rights. 
The world of property provides many examples of the value of 
information about property title. Consider, for instance, the sad case of 
insurance monies and bank assets belonging to victims of the Holocaust. 
While the Nazis looted much of the property of their victims, many 
assets, such as bank accounts in Switzerland, remained out of Nazi 
Germany’s reach. By murdering the owners of the accounts together with 
most of their families, the Nazis left the assets—worth hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars—in the hands of Swiss banks, while the true owners of the 
assets (the heirs of those murdered by the Nazis) had no knowledge of 
their property rights. Knowledge of title to the assets in this case was 
worth hundreds of billions of dollars.6 A more prosaic set of examples 
can be found in the television program “Heir Hunters,” broadcast by the 
British network BBC, focusing on probate detectives and their attempts 
to locate owners who are unaware that they have inherited assets and 
money.7 
Just as the lack of good title information about property can hinder 
owners’ use and enjoyment, the opposite is also true: Full information 
about ownership in assets can help increase value for owners by dis-
couraging nonconsensual takings of the assets. Indeed, this is the reason 
for the rise of registries for rights in movable goods, such as cars and 
                                                                                                                           
 6. Legal resolution of the claims ultimately involved a number of legal and political 
questions beyond the mere question of knowledge of title. For a review of the litigation 
and its settlement, see In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 141–43 
(E.D.N.Y. 2000); Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation (Swiss Banks), http://www.swissbank 
claims.com/Overview.aspx [http://perma.cc/Y8XG-YR6Q] (last updated Sept. 22, 2015). 
 7. See Heir Hunters, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b007nms5 [http:// 
perma.cc/MD82-CUTK] (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (advertising “[s]eries following the 
work of heir hunters, probate detectives looking for distant relatives of people who have 
died without making a will”). Many other examples can be found in the world of 
intellectual property and, in particular, what are known as “orphan copyrights.” See infra 
note 99 and accompanying text (examining prevalence of “orphaned” copyright works). 
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boats. To give a recent example, many universities have established title 
registries in bicycles to battle the epidemic of bicycle theft on campuses.8 
This policy is predicated on the belief that information about assets cre-
ates as important a deterrent against theft as locks, chains, and security 
cameras. 
This Essay constitutes the first attempt to illuminate the symbiotic 
relationships between information and property. It seeks to make three 
contributions to our understanding of how information and property 
interact, each of which targets a separate dimension of the interplay 
between the two. First, we analyze the “obstructive” and “enabling” 
functions of information about title to property. Extant theorizing has 
focused primarily on what we call the “facilitating function” of infor-
mation about property. The facilitating function refers to the role of 
information in streamlining consensual transactions between rights 
holders and legitimate purchasers by lowering transaction costs. Follow-
ing observations first made by Steven Shavell,9 we demonstrate that infor-
mation about property rights performs several key functions (and not 
one as was previously emphasized) in our property system: a facilitating 
function, an obstructive function, and an enabling function. The obstruc-
tive function refers to the ability of information to block, or at least 
hinder, nonconsensual appropriations of property by illicit parties, such 
as thieves and defrauders. The enabling function, by contrast, refers to 
the way title information in the hands of the owners is necessary for them 
to enjoy the benefits of property ownership. Interestingly, we show that 
the three functions can be contradictory or complementary, depending 
on the informational environment. 
Second and equally importantly, we unveil the potential tension 
between title information and the safety of an asset, which we dub “the 
information–asset paradox.” At first blush, it seems clear that society 
would be best off with an informational regime that offers perfect infor-
mation about title to property rights in assets. Upon closer examination 
it becomes clear that is not the case. As we show, in a world with perfect 
information about rights to assets, nonconsensual takers would resort to 
altering physically or even destroying others’ assets. Such activities may 
include disassembling automobiles, machinery, and electronic goods, 
and transforming jewelry into scrap metals.10 Alternatively, where prop-
erty information is collected in a particular location as part of a cen-
tralized registry, but the information is vulnerable, nonconsensual takers 
may attempt to take control of the information and thereby make it 
easier for the property to fall into unsavory hands. The crime of “identity 
theft” is based on just such a practice. By appropriating the owner’s 
                                                                                                                           
 8. See infra section I.C (examining effectiveness of bicycle registries in combating 
theft). 
 9. Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 46–52 (2004). 
 10. See infra section II.A (surveying strategies of nonconsensual takers). 
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“identity,” the thief is able to take possession of all the assets registered in 
the owner’s name.11 
All such activities are value reducing not only for the owner but also 
for society as a whole. Counterintuitively, society is often better off when 
the encroacher misappropriates the owner’s asset instead of destroying it. 
Perfect information about assets will, therefore, not always be in society’s 
best interest. 
Third, we highlight the dynamic nature of property and information 
about property. Assets, property rights, and title information can be 
changed, and there are three different categories of actors who can bring 
about these changes. Property owners (and their potential consensual 
transferees), nonconsensual takers, and the government all constantly 
struggle over the information–asset interplay. Each group’s actions can 
dramatically affect the informational environment that surrounds prop-
erty rights. Adopting a dynamic perspective, we identify the previously 
hidden strategies that animate actions in the world of property in re-
sponse to the informational background. Specifically, we show that when 
information about ownership may be easily manipulated, registries pro-
duce little value for owners. This can best be seen in the copyright realm. 
In the digital world, information about rights may be easily effaced, alter-
ed, and manipulated. As a result, copyright owners face a near impossible 
task controlling their intellectual assets online.12 
Just as importantly, we show that the incentives of the actors are not 
uniform; they may change over time. To point to just one outstanding 
example, consider the incentives of an owner who finds herself in debt 
and possibly subject to enforcement actions by creditors.13 Whereas the 
owner might earlier have sought good title information in order to pro-
tect her ownership interests in assets, the owner might now seek to hide 
assets from creditors and might therefore seek to obscure or destroy title 
information. As owners move closer to insolvency, or as they are more 
likely to lose their assets to creditors, their incentives move closer to 
those of nonconsensual takers, while creditors’ incentives move closer to 
those of solvent owners. 
An important policy implication of our analysis that departs from 
prior theorizing is that, despite the high value of registries, for many 
categories of assets, it does not make sense to establish registries. We 
demonstrate that the key to the successful operation of registries lies not 
in the information per se, but rather in the fit between the information 
                                                                                                                           
 11. See infra notes 123–124 and accompanying text (discussing this nonconsensual 
taker strategy). 
 12. See infra section III.B.1 (considering opportunities for effacement of ownership 
information in copyright context). 
 13. See infra section II.C (examining debtor incentives to conceal title information 
from creditors). 
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and the asset as it exists in the real world.14 In general, registries are most 
valuable when there is confidence that the asset as it exists in the real 
world will continue to match the description in the registry. This is 
because assets may be physically vulnerable even when ownership infor-
mation is protected in registries. The easier it is to undermine the fit 
between asset and information by changing the information or the asset, 
the less valuable the registry will be. For example, when it is possible to 
reconfigure the asset without significant loss in value, as in the case with 
mass-produced jewelry, a title registry will be of only limited value to 
owners.15 
Additionally, it will rarely be socially desirable to make the 
information in registries comprehensive. This is because the value of 
accurate information in facilitating transactions and obstructing invol-
untary takings must be balanced against the costs of obtaining and main-
taining accurate information. The state must also act cautiously before 
investing registries with the final say in establishing title. Where the infor-
mation in registries establishes ownership despite any potential flaws in 
the title, the registries potentially make it easier for involuntary takers to 
“launder” their takings. 
Structurally, the Essay proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we explore 
extant theorizing of the property-information interface. In Part II, we 
offer our account of the relationship between property and information 
by engaging in a dynamic analysis of the two institutions that pays heed 
to the intricate subtleties generated by the interplay between them. In 
Part III, we discuss the informational policies lawmakers should adopt in 
order to improve the workings of our property system. A short conclusion 
ensues. 
I. TRANSACTIONS AND INFORMATION ABOUT PROPERTY 
Information about title to property is vital to the functioning of a 
legal system of property, but, to date, it has drawn distressingly little 
scholarly attention. This is surprising, in particular, given the well-
developed scholarly literature on a closely related question: how the 
internal design of property doctrines and principles conveys ownership 
information. 
The main contributors to this latter literature are Professors Merrill 
and Smith. In their joint work, they advance an information-based 
justification for the closed enumeration rule (numerus clausus), which 
limits the types of property rights (such as fee simple, tenancy in com-
                                                                                                                           
 14. See infra section III.B (emphasizing registries’ role in optimizing alignment 
between asset and identifying information). 
 15. See infra section II.A (noting value of registries is reduced when thieves can 
profitably reconfigure asset). 
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mon, etc.) to those already established by law.16 Professors Merrill and 
Smith explain that since property rights bind third parties, it is desirable 
to limit the number of recognized rights so that third parties will not 
have to expend excessive efforts on educating themselves about the 
content and nature of property rights.17 Accordingly, Professors Merrill 
and Smith argue, the task of recognizing new rights is entrusted to the 
state alone.18 Elaborating on the same theme, Professor Smith, in a series 
of individually authored articles, draws on insights from the economics of 
information to expound the informational effects of such property doc-
trines as possession in order to explain how their doctrinal designs com-
municate information to third parties.19 
Our aim is very different. We do not seek to explain how and why 
the law defines what property rights are. Rather, we ask how and why the 
state conveys information about title in those rights. The most common 
means of conveying information about property rights is a property regis-
try, which lists different property rights and their owners. The extant lit-
erature on registries has primarily focused on one narrow aspect of the 
interplay of asset and information: Registries convey information cheaply 
and thereby lower transaction costs between sellers and buyers of prop-
erty.20 The information in registries allows consensual buyers to identify 
the sellers with whom they wish to transact, as well as to ascertain the 
precise nature and scope of the sellers’ rights. At a risk of a mild over-
generalization, it can be said that existing scholarship focuses on the 
effect of registries on the owner’s ability to transfer property. The schol-
arship highlights what we call the “facilitating function” of registries in 
easing transfers. 
In this Part, we show that registries offer two virtues that have drawn 
far less attention. First, registrations enable owners to recognize their 
ability to use assets. This is most obvious in cases like the Nazi-seized 
                                                                                                                           
 16. Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 3, at 69 (“Permitting free 
customization of new forms of property would impose significant external costs on third 
parties . . . .”). But see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and 
Federalism, 115 Yale L.J. 72, 80 (2005) (advocating “flexible version of the numerus clausus 
principle, [which] allows owners to go beyond the menu of property forms offered in their 
jurisdiction and to import forms from other states that better fit their needs”). 
 17. See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 3, at 27–29 (classifying 
individuals affected by property relations into three categories and arguing third class of 
“other market participants,” i.e. those outside “zone of privity,” are ones most affected by 
failure of information about holding in question). 
 18. Id. at 58–60 (contending courts are inhospitable forum to enlarge closed list of 
property interests and positing function is best discharged by legislature). 
 19. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va. L. 
Rev. 965 (2004); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating 
Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J. 1742 (2007); Henry E. Smith, The Language of 
Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1105 (2003); Smith, Property 
Rules, supra note 3; Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1691 
(2012). 
 20. See infra section I.A (surveying existing literature on registries). 
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assets, where the true owners were unaware of their ownership interests 
in the assets.21 Registries, in such situations, allow owners to discover 
their legal interest and start using their property. In other words, regis-
trations can also be said to fulfill an “enabling” function. 
Second, registrations strengthen owners’ powers of exclusion by 
playing a critical role in deterring involuntary takings or uses of assets. In 
our terminology, the registries bear an “obstructive function” alongside 
their facilitating function. Information about assets thus affects a larger 
audience than merely consensual buyers and sellers. The information 
affects nonconsensual takers who seek to deprive property holders of 
their entitlements by deploying a range of illicit strategies, ranging from 
forceful takings to fraud. As information about the true state of title of an 
asset spreads, the ability of nonconsensual takers to seize control of and 
profitably use the asset shrinks. Nonconsensual takers must curb public 
uses of the assets where their lack of title might be revealed. Additionally, 
nonconsensual takers will encounter greater difficulties in transferring 
possession of the assets.22 Many nonconsensual takers do not intend to 
use the taken assets themselves; rather, they seek to sell them to third 
parties and thereby integrate them into the stream of commerce. A thief 
who operates on a college campus obviously does not need more than 
one bicycle, laptop, or smartphone for self-use; all the other items are 
stolen to be sold to third parties. Better information about licit rights 
obstructs the transfer of property by thieves, deters the thieves’ potential 
customers, and thereby helps secure value in the property rights for the 
licit owner. 
Information in registries, therefore, plays a role in two distinct kinds 
of transfers: It facilitates voluntary licit transfers, while simultaneously 
obstructing involuntary or illicit transfers. Information about property in 
registries is a valuable safety device that works to the advantage of prop-
erty owners. It allows them to use their assets more freely and extensively 
and hence derive more value from them. In this capacity, registries 
strengthen not just owners’ rights to transfer but also their right to 
exclude, which is considered by many property scholars to be the key 
property incident.23 
                                                                                                                           
 21. See Morris A. Ratner, The Settlement of Nazi-Era Litigation Through the 
Executive and Judicial Branches, 20 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 212, 212–24 (2002) (chronicling 
travails of litigants and litigation course that led to successful outcome after several years 
of struggle for recognition of victims’ claims). 
 22. See Shavell, supra note 9, at 47–48 (noting registration systems discourage theft 
because “value of stolen property to a thief is . . . diminished by the chance that it will be 
discovered and taken away and that he will be punished”). 
 23. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730, 
731 (1998) (“[T]he right to exclude others is a necessary and sufficient condition of 
identifying the existence of property.”). 
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In this Part, we explore the function of property registries in facil-
itating licit transactions and obstructing illicit transactions. We begin by 
examining previous analyses of property registration. 
A. The Facilitating Function of Property Registration 
For the most part, existing literature on registries of property infor-
mation may be divided into two major categories: the economic liter-
ature and the legal literature. The economic literature focuses on the 
formalization of property rights. It is characterized by a high level of 
abstraction, but it is not terribly interested in legal niceties. Conse-
quently, it often disregards legal distinctions that we will show are critical. 
The legal literature is curiously out of date—a great deal was written 
about land registration systems in the 1930s, but recent years have seen 
few contributions. 
The main contributors to the economic literature include Hernando 
de Soto, Dean Lueck, Gary Libecap, and Benito Arruñada.24 They discuss 
registration primarily in the broader context of “titling,” often conflating 
the two. Registration and titling, however, are distinct phenomena. Regis-
tration means recording property rights in a fashion that disseminates 
information about them more widely. Titling, by contrast, is concerned 
with the legal validity of claimed property rights. Titling projects attempt 
to grant legal title to assets that are already functionally (though perhaps 
illicitly) “owned” by claimants.25 
For example, in his seminal work on informal property rights in 
Latin America,26 Professor de Soto discusses de facto property rights, 
such as those that exist in favelas in Brazil and urban areas in Peru, where 
squatters possess large swaths of land. While the squatters have no legal 
title to the lands, they operate under a network of informal property 
rights that bind the dwellers inter se and are not recognized by the 
state.27 Addressing the welfare loss resulting from the existence of such 
de facto rights, Professor de Soto points to the importance of formal 
                                                                                                                           
 24. We discuss Steven Shavell’s important contributions separately in section I.B, 
infra. 
 25. We wish to make this conceptual distinction for the sake of clarity. However, cf. 
Anne-Marie Leroy & Jonathan Lindsay, Agricultural Investment and Land: Some 
Reflections on Lessons Learned (and Still to Be Learned) from Experiences with Land 
Titling, 17 Uniform L. Rev. 15, 18–19 (2012) (highlighting different senses in which the 
term “titling” is commonly used and how variants run entire gamut from creating or 
conferring new or heightened legal protection to merely acknowledging existence of 
“well-established” proprietary rights). 
 26. Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West 
and Fails Everywhere Else (2000). 
 27. Id. at 88–95 (detailing myriad ways in which extralegal property arrangements 
mark their presence in developing world). 
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state recognition of property rights.28 Professor de Soto argues that the 
absence of state recognition and registration of these property rights 
greatly diminishes their value (and therefore further impoverishes the 
squatters).29 For example, Professor de Soto notes that favela dwellers 
cannot use equity in their de facto realty holdings as security for loans, 
and therefore cannot use them to support the creation of businesses.30 
Because the informal property lacks the panoply of protections that 
come with state recognition, it cannot be mortgaged, pledged, or levied 
upon.31 Professor de Soto’s proposed solution is a massive titling effort 
that would bring those rights into the formal property system.32 His 
proposal pays relatively little attention to the legal details of such an 
effort. 
In legal parlance, Professor de Soto’s work concentrates on the issue 
of titling.33 That is, Professor de Soto is primarily interested in the state 
assigning legal title. Our Essay, by contrast, focuses not on the question of 
who should get legal title but how to treat information about the already 
existing title. The benefits anticipated by Professor de Soto naturally 
require both titling and registering. Few banks would agree to lend 
money on the security of a mortgage were the title unregistered, even if 
the title were legally cognizable. Nonetheless, Professor de Soto’s work 
conflates the questions, treating the process of titling as necessarily en-
tailing recording as well.34 
                                                                                                                           
 28. Id. at 47–62 (identifying six important ways legal recognition of proprietary 
interests can benefit economy). But see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Property 
Lost in Translation, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 515, 570–72 (2013) (citing Professor de Soto’s work 
and cautioning mere recordation of property interests may not necessarily work when 
localized property norms are at variance with state-imposed regulatory framework). 
 29. De Soto, supra note 26, at 29 (pointing out how many real estate holdings are 
extralegal from beginning or fall out of law’s ambit due to mounting compliance costs, 
resulting in many potential assets not being identified or realized). 
 30. Id. at 85–86 (declaring this to be state of legal apartheid). 
 31. Cf. id. at 56 (discussing ability of Western formal property systems to protect and 
track property through public recordkeeping and thereby enable utilization of assets as 
capital). 
 32. See id. at 39–40, 45–46, 49–51 (“What the poor lack is easy access to the [formal] 
property mechanisms that could legally fix the economic potential of their assets so that 
they could be used to produce, secure or guarantee greater value in the expanded 
market.”). 
 33. See Bernadette Atuahene, Land Titling: A Mode of Privatization with the 
Potential to Deepen Democracy, 50 St. Louis U. L.J. 761, 761 (2006) (defining “land 
titling” as phenomenon where governments give individuals ownership to land they 
occupy). 
 34. One reason that the phenomena of titling and registration are often conflated is 
that doctrines like adverse possession that award title to certain kinds of nonconsensual 
possessors can be used both to update defective registrations and to reallocate title to 
presumably better owners. A project that records titles of squatters—one of the central 
themes of Professor de Soto, supra note 26—thus simultaneously reallocates title and 
registers it. 
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Another representative example of the economic literature can be 
found in a series of recent articles by Professors Libecap and Lueck.35 
The articles stem from a large empirical study of land demarcation.36 
Professors Libecap and Lueck examine patterns of demarcation—essen-
tially, the division of land into individual lots. In particular, they compare 
two demarcation systems that predominate in the United States: the 
rectangular system and the metes and bounds system.37 Under the metes-
and-bounds system, which is common to fifteen states, the boundaries of 
land parcels are marked by reference to landmarks or topographic fea-
tures.38 For example, a parcel may be recorded as extending from the 
riverbed on the south and the west to the peach tree orchard on the 
north and the brick wall on the east. The rectangular system, by contrast, 
relies on a grid formation comprised of uniform square lots, each of 
which is designated by a unique sector address.39 A lot might be known as 
unit 115/93, where 115 and 93 are x- and y-coordinates on a map of a 
large area. Professors Libecap and Lueck’s main finding is that the 
rectangular system is generally associated with higher land values.40 
While Professors Libecap and Lueck’s work demonstrates the value 
of good information about property, it treats a very special case: where 
the information about the property is conveyed by the shape of the asset 
itself. Thus, although the focal point of their work is historical asset con-
figuration—that is, how the land was physically divided into smaller par-
cels—Professors Libecap and Lueck’s analysis contains only a veiled 
reference to land registries. In listing the advantages of the rectangular 
system, Professors Libecap and Lueck note the informational benefits of 
this system. Specifically, they assert that the rectangular system prevents 
strategic land grabs among neighbors by establishing clear information 
about parcel borders.41 More generally, they claim that the rectangular 
system “reduces potential for overlapping, conflicting claims; allows for a 
common address system[;] and importantly, lowers transaction costs, pro-
                                                                                                                           
 35. See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role 
of Coordinating Property Institutions, 119 J. Pol. Econ. 426, 428 (2011) (arguing rec-
tangular system lowers costs incurred in enforcement of property rights, trading of 
property, and coordination for purposes of infrastructure investment, but at cost of 
inflexibility during demarcation of land boundaries). 
 36. See id. at 436–59. 
 37. Id. at 427. 
 38. See id. (“[The metes and bounds system] is decentralized, whereby each indiv-
idual defines parcels independently and idiosyncratically [through reference to] nonstan-
dard, impermanent [markers, such as trees, structures, and adjacent properties].”). 
 39. Id. at 427–28. 
 40. Id. at 428–29. 
 41. See id. at 453 (demonstrating rates of boundary disputes, entry disputes, and 
survey disputes were far higher when metes and bounds system used than with rectangular 
system). 
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moting land markets.”42 Like Professor de Soto, Professors Libecap and 
Lueck conflate titling and registration questions and pay little heed to 
the legal machinery that accompanies the land demarcation. They do 
not discuss recordation systems, or even the legal implications of the dif-
ference between registration and recordation.43 Simply put, they do not 
distinguish between the form in which the law recognizes property rights 
and the form in which the state records them. Hence, the utility of their 
study for legal theorists is limited. 
More generally, multiple economic theorists have championed what 
has come to be called, in economic parlance, an institutional approach 
to property. Both utilizing44 and departing45 from insights gleaned from 
the writings of Ronald Coase, institutional economic contributions pro-
ceed from the assumption that as long as transaction costs are sufficiently 
low, markets can be relied on to achieve an efficient allocation of re-
sources.46 On this vision, assets—or more precisely the legal rights to 
assets—gravitate through a series of voluntary transfers to their highest-
value user. The initial allocation of resources is of limited importance 
since the market can “correct” misallocations. The important thing 
about the initial allocation is that it must clearly define the underlying 
assets and rights in them.47 In other words, the initial allocation must 
satisfy certain informational minima necessary for the operation of mar-
kets.48 The gist of this thread in the literature is captured by the following 
                                                                                                                           
 42. Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of 
Coordinating Institutions 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14942, 
2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401787 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 43. We discuss the differences between recordation and registration in section III.A, 
infra. 
 44. E.g. Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 11–14 (2d ed. 1997) 
[hereinafter Barzel, Economic Analysis] (citing Professor Coase’s focus on contract 
formation between value-maximizing individuals as “central to the property rights 
approach”); Benito Arruñada, Property as an Economic Concept: Reconciling Legal and 
Economic Conceptions of Property Rights in a Coasean Framework, 59 Int’l Rev. Econ. 
121, 122–27 (2012) [hereinafter Arruñada, Property as Economic Concept] (applying 
Coasean framework to identify conflict between in rem property enforcement and 
transaction costs, and suggesting maintenance of public registry as viable solution to 
address this conflict). 
 45. E.g. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law 
and Economics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357, 360 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, What 
Happened to Property] (critiquing Professor Coase’s contribution to understanding of 
property as “cluster of in personam rights” which, according to the authors, hastened 
“demise of the in rem conception of property”). 
 46. Barzel, Economic Analysis, supra note 44, at 51–53 (asserting parties in market 
will attempt to adopt contract form that “generates the largest net output value”); Merrill 
& Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note 45, at 374. 
 47. Arruñada, Property as Economic Concept, supra note 44, at 121–22. 
 48. Professor Coase offered this observation himself. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 16 (1960) (“[T]he initial delimitation of legal rights does 
have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates.”). As Professor 
Arruñada critically writes, this literature adopts “a simplistic view of Coase (1960), to see 
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two propositions: (a) information about entitlements lowers transaction 
costs; and (b) by lowering transaction costs and streamlining transactions 
between willing sellers and willing buyers, information makes entitle-
ments more marketable and thereby increases their value. 
Critically, this transactional perspective has grown to predominate 
the limited literature on registries. The work of Professor Arruñada is a 
case in point.49 Professor Arruñada, arguably the most prolific scholar on 
registration and recordation systems, criticizes the work of his fellow 
economists—and even his own early work—for remaining “‘ignorant of 
property law,’”50 and in particular, for ignoring the in rem nature of 
property rights and for failing to distinguish them from contractual, in 
personam rights.51 In his work, Professor Arruñada meticulously distin-
guishes between property rights and contractual rights, but his perspec-
tive remains decidedly transactional. As he writes, the survival of property 
rights “after conveyance of the asset or any other transformation of rights 
requires costly institutions and resources in order to organize the process 
of searching, bargaining and contracting for consent.”52 Furthermore, 
the main problem on which Professor Arruñada focuses is that of asym-
metric information between buyers and sellers and in particular, the risk 
of fraudulent transfers by sellers, which may lead to the creation of “hid-
den property rights.”53 Professor Arruñada explains: 
[T]he seller knows better than the acquirer about hidden prop-
erty rights. More generally, the need of knowing which conflict-
ting property rights exist, finding out who their right holders 
are, bargaining with such right holders to obtain their consent 
and contracting or somehow formalizing an agreement with 
them, all increase the costs of transforming and conveying 
rights.54 
The same transactional concerns animate Professor Arruñada’s 
other research in this area. For example, in another paper, Professor 
Arruñada points out the ability of rights registries to reduce transaction 
costs that attend rights transfers owing to their ability to reduce the need 
for expensive professional services that traditionally accompanied land 
                                                                                                                           
property as a mere bundle of use rights and to consider that these are strong if well 
defined, if their content is precisely delineated and they are clearly allocated to 
individuals.” Arruñada, Property as Economic Concept, supra note 44, at 132. 
 49. See, e.g., Benito Arruñada, Institutional Foundations of Impersonal Exchange: 
Theory and Policy of Contractual Registries 2–3 (2012) (assessing role of registries in 
reducing transaction costs of impersonal trade). 
 50. Arruñada, Property as Economic Concept, supra note 44, at 132 (quoting Dean 
Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, Property Law § 5.1.1, in 1 Handbook of Law and Economics 
183, 187 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007)). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Benito Arruñada, Property Titling and Conveyancing, in Research Handbook on 
the Economics of Property Law 237, 238 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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transactions.55 Registries, by providing accessible and accurate infor-
mation about rights in assets, lower search costs for acquirers and 
thereby reduce the need for the services of lawyers, public notaries, and 
licensed conveyers.56 
Surprisingly, a review of the legal literature reveals a paucity of 
recent theoretical articles on registration and communication of infor-
mation about property rights. The most significant legal treatment of 
registration, which sets the stage for our analysis, can be found in a 1984 
article by Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson.57 Professors Baird and 
Jackson begin their analysis with the observation that in ancient times, 
possession was the legal mechanism by which property owners informed 
the public of their rights.58 Transfer of property rights without transfer of 
possession was considered a fraudulent transaction, null and void under 
the law.59 The emergence of registration dramatically transformed the 
field of property law. Registration, Professors Baird and Jackson observe, 
affords property owners a cost-effective way to notify the public of their 
rights, which is critical for the operation of rights in rem.60 The existence 
of a central registry, by publicizing property entitlements, affords owners 
a much greater degree of freedom with respect to rights transfers.61 
Professors Baird and Jackson, two of the most prominent bankruptcy 
theorists of our time, illustrate this effect by discussing the ability of 
property owners to use their assets as collateral for loans.62 Indeed, since 
security interests are rarely possessory, registries can be central to the 
functioning of secured debt.63 The more general point, however, is that 
registration adds value for owners by allowing them to engage in trans-
fers of rights that they could not otherwise execute.64 This phenomenon 
is what we dub the facilitating effect of information about property. 
                                                                                                                           
 55. Benito Arruñada, Market and Institutional Determinants in the Regulation of 
Conveyancers, 23 Eur. J.L. & Econ. 93, 100–01 (2007) (identifying important ways in which 
registration system reduces transaction and search costs). 
 56. See id. at 102–04 (presenting empirical demonstration of registration faring 
much better than mere recordal of rights in lowering transaction costs such as fee paid for 
conveyancing services). Of course, the initial registration itself is not costless. See infra 
section II.B.2 (enumerating various initial costs of registration). 
 57. Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of 
Property, 13 J. Legal Stud. 299 (1984) [hereinafter Baird & Jackson, Uncertainty and 
Transfer]. 
 58. Id. at 302–03. 
 59. Id. at 302. 
 60. See id. at 304–05 (pointing out land ownership is ideal subject matter for imple-
mentation of recording systems). 
 61. Id. at 305–06. 
 62. Id. at 307–08. 
 63. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and Liens: The End of Notice in 
Commercial Finance Law, 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 421, 425–26 (2005) (explaining role of 
registries in perfecting security interests under UCC). 
 64. Building on this insight, Chagai Vinizky has recently advocated the creation of a 
registry for trade secrets. See Chagai Vinizky, Trade Secrets Registry, 35 Pace L. Rev. 455, 
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On this basis, Professors Baird and Jackson introduce their core 
thesis. They note the existence of a bidirectional relationship between 
the applicable legal regime and the informational environment concern-
ing property rights. The legal system can greatly enhance disclosure of 
information about property rights by establishing registries and 
mandating registration of transfers. This, in turn, can increase the value 
of property rights.65 However, since there is a cost to setting up and 
maintaining registries, it may not be beneficial to establish registries in all 
cases.66 Hence, Professors Baird and Jackson’s main goal is to specify the 
conditions under which registries are socially desirable. 
Unfortunately, Professors Baird and Jackson do not offer a compre-
hensive analytical framework that allows us to assess the desirability of 
registries in all cases. Instead, they offer a series of discrete observations. 
Specifically, they argue that registries are unlikely to be cost effective 
when the rights in the underlying asset are subject to frequent transfers.67 
The authors speculate that a high rate of transfers necessitates frequent 
updating of the registry and that the cost of doing so may outweigh the 
benefits.68 Professors Baird and Jackson also note that registries do not 
work cost effectively when it is impossible to identify the underlying asset 
with sufficient precision or at a sufficiently low cost. As an example, they 
consider the possibility of registering title in a particular grain of wheat.69 
More generally, it can be said that high demarcation and identification 
costs may outweigh the benefits of registries’ information-forcing 
effects.70 Finally, Professors Baird and Jackson posit that registries for 
personal property would be of limited use when they are geographically 
                                                                                                                           
457 (2014) (suggesting trade secrets registry would create value by reducing transaction 
and financing costs). 
 65. See Baird & Jackson, Uncertainty and Transfer, supra note 57, at 301 (arguing 
increases in available information about ownership create value by reducing risk for 
transacting parties). 
 66. Id. at 305. 
 67. Id. at 304, 306. 
 68. Id. at 306. Here, we feel obliged to remind our reader that Professors Baird and 
Jackson conducted their analysis at a time when digital databases and electronic updating 
amounted to science fiction. As in many other cases, registries provide another example of 
the interface between property and technology. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 
102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1330 (1993) (stating “efficiency thesis predicts that innovations in 
technologies for marking, defending, and proving boundaries lead to more parcelization 
because they reduce the transaction costs of private property regimes” and leveraging 
example of barbed wire’s effect on American West). 
 69. See Baird & Jackson, Uncertainty and Transfer, supra note 57, at 306–07 
(remarking on difficulty of registering and discerning origins of siloed wheat and sug-
gesting “[p]ossession is often more reliable than description in sorting between personal 
property”). 
 70. Technology may lower such demarcation costs. See Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 531, 565 (2005) [hereinafter Bell 
& Parchomovsky, Property Theory] (noting development of barbed-wire demarcation 
reduced costs of property protection). 
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restricted to a certain jurisdiction, say New York State, and the asset, say 
an automobile, can be easily moved to a different jurisdiction, say, 
California.71 This problem does not arise with respect to real estate.72 
The literature that is closest to our concerns has seen few 
contributions in the last seventy years. A 1938 study of registration 
systems by Richard Powell73 prompted a series of articles arguing against 
Professor Powell’s conclusions. Professor Powell had argued against 
expanded use of the Torrens land registry system—a registration system 
that offers greater protection to registered owners that we discuss in 
detail later in this Essay.74 Torrens systems greatly increase the impor-
tance of land registration by making registration an almost undefeatable 
proof of title. Professor Powell argued that in providing state guarantees 
of title in land, the Torrens system did little more than place the state in 
the role of private title insurance companies, but at far greater expense.75 
Professor Powell thus argued that adopting a Torrens system of land 
registration would produce unnecessary costs with no real benefit.76 
Critics claimed that Professor Powell misread the data, and that Torrens 
land registry systems provided clear advantages to the public by giving 
potential purchasers guarantees of the legal validity of their 
acquisitions.77 But Professor Powell’s approach won the day. Torrens land 
registry systems are not widely used in the United States today.78 
Only a handful of works in recent decades have revisited the old 
debates. Together with several other co-authors, Thomas Miceli and C.F. 
Sirmans examined issues related to title searches and land title registries 
                                                                                                                           
 71. Baird & Jackson, Uncertainty and Transfer, supra note 57, at 310 (“Automobiles, 
by contrast, which are not subject to a federal system, create problems when they are 
moved from one jurisdiction to another . . . .”). 
 72. Id. (“Real property, by definition, never moves.”). 
 73. Richard R. Powell, Registration of the Title to Land in the State of New York 
(1938). 
 74. See infra section II.B.3 (examining impact of Torrens system in tightening 
alignment between assets and information in land registration). 
 75. Powell, supra note 73, at 42 (detailing costs and expenses involved in registration 
system); see also id. at 49–50 (estimating “cost of an initial registration is approximately 
twice the cost of an original policy of title insurance and approximately three times the 
cost of a ‘re-issued’ policy”). 
 76. Id. at 73. 
 77. See, e.g., Walter Fairchild & William Springer, A Criticism of Professor Richard R. 
Powell’s Book Entitled Registration of Title to Land in the State of New York, 24 Cornell L.Q. 
557, 558 (1939) (suggesting Professor Powell’s account was unfair in its characterization of 
Torrens System); Myres S. McDougal & John W. Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A 
Regression, 48 Yale L.J. 1125, 1151 (1939) (finding Professor Powell’s objections to 
Torrens system to be unjustified). 
 78. For an overview of the historic debates, as well as the U.S. experience with 
different registration systems, see generally Blair C. Shick & Irving H. Plotkin, Torrens in 
the United States: A Legal and Economic History and Analysis of American Land 
Registration Systems 1–23 (1978). 
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in the United States in a series of articles.79 In one article, Professors 
Miceli and Sirmans provided an economic model to explain what they 
saw as the advantage of the Torrens system.80 They argued that where 
transaction costs are high, a Torrens system can play an important role in 
allocating ownership to the higher value owner among claimants to 
title.81 In another article co-authored with Henry Munneke and Geoffrey 
Turnbull,82 Professors Miceli and Sirmans compared different recording 
systems for land in Cook County, Illinois. Their study showed that, all 
things being equal, land registered under a Torrens system is more 
valuable than land whose transactions are recorded under a competing 
system.83 Joseph Janczyk similarly argued in favor of the Torrens system in 
an article claiming that the Torrens system would lower transaction costs 
enough to justify the costs of adopting a new Torrens registration sys-
tem.84 We revisit the topic of Torrens registration later in our Essay.85 It 
should be noted, however, there are constant calls to establish new regis-
tries of intellectual property rights. Two representative examples include 
Chagai Vinizky’s call for the adoption of a trade secrets registry86 and 
Jorge Contreras’s proposal to establish a registry of patent pledges.87 
Both scholars put forth very thoughtful and detailed blueprints for im-
plementing each of the proposed registries. 
B. The Obstructive and Enabling Functions of Registering Information About 
Property 
As we showed in the previous section, theorists have focused pri-
marily on the facilitating effect of registering information about property. 
That is, theorists have generally restricted their analyses of the value of 
registration to the positive effect registration has on easing transactions 
                                                                                                                           
 79. See, e.g., Matthew Baker, Thomas J. Miceli, C.F. Sirmans & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, 
Optimal Title Search, 31 J. Legal Stud. 139, 139–40 (2002) (modeling costs incurred by 
would-be purchasers, through review of public records of land transactions, in trying to 
determine chain of title). 
 80. Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, The Economics of Land Transfer and Title 
Insurance, 10 J. Real Est. Fin. & Econ. 81 (1995). 
 81. Id. at 87. 
 82. Thomas J. Miceli, Henry J. Munneke, C.F. Sirmans & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Title 
Systems and Land Values, 45 J.L. & Econ. 565 (2002). 
 83. Id. at 578 (“[P]roperty registered using the Torrens system will have a higher 
price than property recorded in the recording system.”). 
 84. Joseph T. Janczyk, An Economic Analysis of the Land Title Systems for 
Transferring Real Property, 6 J. Legal Stud. 213, 220–26 (1977). 
 85. See infra sections II.B.3, III.B.3 (considering mechanisms and effectiveness of 
Torrens systems). 
 86. See Vinizky, supra note 64, at 457 (advocating establishment of trade secrets 
registry). 
 87. See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 Ariz. St. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) 
(manuscript at 52–64) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing contours of 
proposed registry for patent pledges). 
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between selling owners and voluntary buyers. In the remainder of this 
Part, we focus on the importance of the second and third functions of 
registries, which we term the “obstructive” and “enabling” functions, re-
spectively. The registration of information about property rights critically 
affects not only the owner’s right to transfer but also her right to use the 
asset as well as her right to exclude. 
We begin by briefly discussing the facilitative function and then pro-
ceed, in order, to the obstructive and enabling functions. 
1. The Obstructive Function. — Registries’ facilitating function is easily 
described. The facilitating function of registries aids transfers insofar as 
registries constitute a reliable source of information about rights in as-
sets. Once a registry for rights in specific assets is established and the 
public can access the information it contains, third parties can readily 
observe the nature of the rights in the underlying asset and the identity 
of the owner. For example, once a registry for artworks exists, anyone in 
the world interested in buying rights to a particular painting can easily 
verify that the seller is legally entitled to transfer the rights. As noted 
above,88 this means that buyers enjoy greater security in their acquisitions 
and will therefore, presumably, pay more for the rights they acquire. This 
makes an owner’s ability to transfer rights more valuable, and therefore 
makes ownership of property rights in general more valuable. 
But just as a registry conveys (and potentially certifies) information, 
it necessarily denies and discredits other information that is inconsistent 
with the information contained in the registry. Registries enable third 
parties to know who does not have rights in an asset. The following ex-
ample is illustrative. Assume that Anne owns Blackacre in fee simple and 
that her rights are registered in her state’s land registry. Beatrice, a con 
artist, forges some legal documents pertaining to the legal rights in 
Blackacre and seeks to transfer her “rights” to Cecile. In this case, there 
is no information in the land registry reflecting Beatrice’s claimed rights. 
Cecile would have no problem learning that Beatrice has no legal rights 
to transfer; a quick look at the land registry would tell her as much. Just 
as the information in the registry facilitates potential transfers by Anne, it 
obstructs potential transfers by Beatrice. This obstructive function adds 
to the value of owners’ property rights as well. 
Of course, the existence of the rights registry would deter Beatrice 
and like-minded parties from even attempting the illicit land transfer. By 
lowering the likelihood of success of some fraudulent transfers to vir-
tually zero, the registries create a strong disincentive to tamper with 
many legal rights in land. This too results in greater security of owner-
ship for the legal owners. 
Obviously, this analysis is not confined to rights in land. Registries 
for rights in chattels have the same effect: They obstruct the ability of 
                                                                                                                           
 88. See supra section I.A (outlining facilitative function of registries). 
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illicit possessors to transfer movable assets. 
Consider a world where information about legal property rights in 
chattels cannot be reliably conveyed other than by possession. As Pro-
fessors Baird and Jackson note, this is a good historical description of the 
world prior to registries.89 Absent a registry of the rights to a specific 
chattel, possession is the best indicia of ownership. Historically, this is 
one of the reasons that possession is nine points of the law in property.90 
In the world without registries, third parties would have little choice but 
to rely on the fact of possession as the best evidence of ownership unless 
something aroused their suspicion. But possession is a highly imperfect 
proxy for ownership. Self-evidently, possession only coincides with owner-
ship as long as the true owner maintains possession of her valuable assets. 
Once the owner surrenders her possession, either wittingly or not, there 
is no longer convergence between ownership and possession. This can 
happen voluntarily in the case of a bailment, pledge, or loan of the asset. 
It can happen involuntarily as well, as in cases of theft or fraud. 
Importantly, from the vantage point of nonvoluntary takers, this 
state of affairs provides an incentive to grab possession of other people’s 
valuables. When market transactions are strictly possession based, non-
consensual takers can pass themselves off as legal owners simply by 
acquiring possession. Where the market for automobiles relies solely on 
the fact of possession to prove ownership, theft of possession of a car is a 
valuable way to achieve the benefit of car ownership, including the ability 
to use the car and to transfer it. 
Registries do not eliminate all nonconsensual takings. Conversions 
for self-use can be valuable to thieves even without the possibility of fu-
ture sales on the black market. In such cases, registries would diminish 
convertors’ incentive to take only if the chattel is readily identifiable and 
its use is open and notorious, as in the case of a stolen automobile. Auto-
mobiles are easy to identify and it is difficult to drive them clandestinely. 
But smaller items like electric appliances present a very different case. 
Televisions, for example, cannot be identified readily and can be used in 
the privacy of a thief’s home. 
Registries are a much stronger deterrent in a second case: conver-
sions of chattels for transfer to a different user. Here, the existence of a 
registry makes the underlying asset much less marketable in the hands of 
a thief. A registry allows potential buyers to ascertain the rights in an 
asset and abstain from transacting with nonregistered owners. For ex-
ample, the establishment of a registry for bicycles or artworks dramati-
cally reduces the size of the secondary market from the vantage point of 
                                                                                                                           
 89. Baird & Jackson, Uncertainty and Transfer, supra note 57, at 302–03. 
 90. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An 
Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 175, 180–81 (1983) (mapping legal 
terrain dealing with preferential treatment of certain nonpossessory interests over secured 
interests with respect to same property). 
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thieves. Cautious purchasers would always turn to the registry to check 
the identity of the rightful owner. 
Naturally, some buyers would agree to transact with a thief for the 
“right” price. Hence, registries cannot completely wipe out nonconsen-
sual takings of movable property. But even here, they clearly dampen the 
incentive to engage in nonconsensual appropriations for three reasons. 
First, as we already noted, registries eliminate the prospect of transacting 
with an honest buyer. This in turn ought to have a negative effect on the 
price a thief can charge. The lower the price, the smaller the expected 
return on thievery, which reduces the lure of the activity relative to legit-
imate alternatives. Second, registries increase the likelihood of appre-
hension and punishment. In a world with effective registries, illicit pos-
sessors cannot present the stolen good to potential buyers without risking 
being reported to the authorities. In the presence of this risk, convertors 
have to expend considerable resources on screening purchasers, which 
further erodes their profit margin. Third, and finally, dishonest pur-
chasers who are willing to transact with thieves should face the same costs 
if they try to resell the chattel in the future. For all these reasons, poten-
tial purchasers would be willing to pay less for the item. 
The combination of these factors makes registries valuable for prop-
erty owners, even where the owners have no plans to transfer title to the 
asset. 
Registration is a relatively simple and inexpensive act.91 Yet it pro-
vides property owners with effective protection against nonconsensual 
takers and thereby enhances the value of the objects in their hands. In 
the absence of a registry, property owners might be forced to engage in 
duplicative expenditures to protect their possession. And the best alter-
native means may often be much more expensive and much less ef-
fective. 
It is important to note that while the obstructive function of regis-
tries has drawn less scholarly attention than the facilitative function, 
there have been a handful of important works that have noted its exis-
tence and importance. Perhaps the outstanding example is found in 
Professor Shavell’s description of registries in his sweeping Foundations of 
Economic Analysis of Law.92 Professor Shavell describes “discourag[ing] 
theft” as one of the two principal virtues of registration systems, and he 
notes that the presence of a property registry reduces the ability of the 
thief both to use and to transfer the property.93 However, Professor 
Shavell adds a curious note of skepticism, arguing that individual owners 
are unlikely to consider the value of deterring thieves in considering 
                                                                                                                           
 91. This is not to say that registration is costless. See infra section II.B.2 (illustrating 
potential costs of registration in IP context). 
 92. Shavell, supra note 9, at 47–48. 
 93. Id. 
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whether to register ownership in a particular asset, given that the mar-
ginal deterrence for a single registration is quite small.94 
2. The Enabling Function. — Knowledge about title to property comes 
into play in more than just transactions. Obviously, title information is 
vital both to potential buyers of assets and to their potential noncon-
sensual takers. Less obviously, but no less vitally, knowledge about title is 
necessary for owners to enjoy the benefit of their property rights. An heir 
who has no knowledge of her newly inherited rights has no ability to 
enjoy the property, either directly or by transferring it to another. Regis-
tries can fill the role of informing owners of their rights and thereby 
enable owners’ use of their property. Registries thus fulfill an enabling 
function, in parallel with their obstructive and facilitative functions. High 
profile cases—such as lost assets of the survivors of the Holocaust95—
provide outstanding examples of the enabling function of property regis-
tries. 
There are many other examples. For instance, since there is no 
registry of lost chattels, owners will find it virtually impossible to locate 
their lost goods. Aware of this fact, owners of lost property often decide 
to forego the cost of searching for their goods. Of the many attractions of 
Alabama, one stands out (at least for our purposes): the Unclaimed 
Baggage Center, advertised under the slogan “You Never Know What 
You’ll Find.”96 As many as 68,000 suitcases and luggage items are never 
picked up every year and if they remain unclaimed for ninety days, most 
airlines sell them to the Unclaimed Baggage Center.97 These items repre-
sent only a small fraction of the universe of lost chattels. There can be 
little doubt that if a central registry for lost items existed, many owners, 
with the aid of new search technologies could reunite with their lost 
chattels. 
Consider, as well, copyright registries. Registration is not a prereq-
uisite for securing copyright protection; it is merely a precondition for 
filing an infringement suits. As a result, many expressive works that are 
not involved in litigation are never registered. Since copyright protection 
remains in effect seventy years after the death of the author,98 many legal 
heirs and devisees may never learn of their rights under the Copyright 
Act. The existence of a more comprehensive registry that covered all 
copyrighted works would greatly assist authors’ heirs and devisees in 
                                                                                                                           
 94. Id. at 48–49. 
 95. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (suggesting property registries might 
have alerted heirs to the existence of such assets). 
 96. Unclaimed Baggage Ctr., http://www.unclaimedbaggage.com/ [http://perma.cc/ 
SK4T-4WAW] (last visited Sept. 18, 2015). 
 97. Terry Maxon, Alabama Store Is Last Stop for Lost Luggage, Dall. Morning News 
(May 4, 2011, 9:41 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/airline-industry/20110504-
alabama-store-is-last-stop-for-lost-luggage.ece [http://perma.cc/DGA7-PJK4] (last updated 
May 5, 2011, 9:21 AM).  
 98. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). 
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becoming informed of their rights. Indeed, the problem of owners not 
knowing their copyright rights is acknowledged as a contributing factor 
to the problem of “orphan” works.99 
At the same time, such examples illustrate the difficulty registries 
have in enabling owners’ use of their assets. Simply put, registries are not 
self-executing. Registries in the modern world do not provide informa-
tion to interested parties automatically. Registries reveal their informa-
tion only upon being searched. When owners do not suspect that they 
own assets, there is little reason for them to start searching the various 
registries around the world that may reveal some hidden ownership. It is 
for this reason that self-appointed heir hunters,100 and other detectives 
who seek unknowing owners, are able to collect such high fees for their 
services. 
The enabling function of registries should not be dismissed, how-
ever. In the information age, search protocols are improving and greater 
quantities of information are becoming available. It is not difficult to 
imagine a day in the not-distant future when individuals will be able to 
program repeated searches in multiple registries for assets of which they 
may have lost track or about which they might never have known. 
C. Measuring the Informational Value of Property Registration 
It is not surprising that empirical studies of the value of property 
registration are few and far between. As we have noted, there is little 
writing directly on the question of the value of information about prop-
erty rights.101 However, those empirical studies that have been conducted 
seem, in the main, to reinforce our theoretical claims about the facilita-
tive and obstructive value of property registrations. 
   
                                                                                                                           
 99. In the United States, a study conducted by Carnegie Mellon found that twenty-
two percent of copyrighted works were orphan works. Carnegie Mellon Univ. Libraries, 
Reply Comment in Response to Notice of Inquiry about Orphan Works 3 (2005), 
http://copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0537-CarnegieMellon.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/53P3-437A]. A 2010 report written for the European Commission estimates the number 
of orphan copyrighted works in Europe at three million books (or thirteen percent of all 
in-copyright works). Anna Vuopala, European Comm’n, Directorate Gen. Info. Soc’y & 
Media, Assessment of the Orphan Works Issue and Costs for Rights Clearance 5 (2010), 
http://www.ace-film.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Copyright_anna_report-1.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/FP8N-8GCC]. A 2011 report by the British Library suggested that the 
percentage of orphan works may be as high as forty-three percent. Press Release, British 
Library, Electronic Clearance of Orphan Works Significantly Accelerates Mass Digitisation 
(2011), http://www.bl.uk/press-releases/2011/september/electronic-clearance-of-orphan-
works-significantly-accelerates-mass-digitisation [http://perma.cc/Y47R-KEXK]. 
 100. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (noting utility of heir hunters in realign-
ing assets with ownership information). 
 101. See supra Introduction (assessing prior scholarship on intersection between 
property and information). 
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Professor de Soto’s empirical work on formalization of legal rights in 
property may provide a crude measure of the added value registration 
creates for land owners. Professor de Soto famously estimated that in 
Peru alone there is a loss of $74 billion in what he calls “dead capital.”102 
The loss stems from the fact that when property rights are not formally 
recognized by the state they cannot be used by the owners to raise capital 
via securitized transactions. In the legal world, formalization of rights in 
land and registration typically go hand in hand as a practical matter. 
However, analytically, the two concepts are distinct. It may very well be 
that in the cases studied by Professor de Soto, most of the benefit would 
accrue to owners from formalization, irrespective of registration. Hence, 
one cannot cleanly translate Professor de Soto’s studies into proof of the 
value of registration. 
Additionally, subsequent empirical research has called into question 
some of Professor de Soto’s predictions about the benefits associated with 
titling. For example, Jean-Philippe Platteau, who studied land titling in 
sub-Saharan Africa, argued that the expected benefits from land titling 
were overestimated103 and that it is far from clear that they outweigh the 
costs. 
In short, so long as studies conflate titling efforts with registration, it 
is very difficult to prove empirically the facilitative effects of land regis-
tries. In addition, there are often other confounding factors that affect 
land values at the same time as registration, in particular since the 
benefits of land registries are often fully realized years after the initial 
registration, making them hard to track.104 It is not surprising that econ-
omists105 and the World Bank106 have emphasized the need for empirical 
work on the long-term effects of registries. 
                                                                                                                           
 102. De Soto, supra note 26, at 31 (“The value of extralegally held rural and urban 
real estate in Peru amounts to some $74 billion.”). De Soto’s figures have been disputed. 
See Kevin E. Davis, The Rules of Capitalism, 22 Third World Q. 675, 678 (2001) (reviewing 
Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else (2000)) (calling de Soto’s findings “provocative” but lamenting his 
figures “are presented in such a cursory fashion that at times it is difficult to derive any 
sense of how they were produced”); Jim Thomas, Hernando de Soto’s The Mystery of 
Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, 34 J. Latin Am. Stud. 
189, 189–90 (2002) (book review) (questioning methodologies employed by de Soto in 
valuing dead capital); Christopher Woodruff, Review of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital, 39 
J. Econ. Literature 1215, 1220–22 (2001) (book review) (“[T]he data available in the 
book’s appendix suggest that $9.24 trillion is an exaggerated estimate [of the value of 
developing countries’ untitled real estate].”). 
 103. Jean-Philippe Platteau, The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights as Applied to 
Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical Assessment, 27 Dev. & Change 29, 74–75 (1996). 
 104. See de Soto, supra note 26, at 46–47 (explaining mystery of capital’s successes to 
be shrouded in thousands of legislations, regulations, and institutions that govern record-
ing system and render effects difficult to observe). 
 105. See, e.g., Grenville Barnes, A Comparative Evaluation Framework for Cadastre-
Based Land Information Systems (CLIS) in Developing Countries 3 (Land Tenure Ctr., 
Research Paper No. 102, 1990), http://minds.wisconsin.edu/handle/1793/34180 (on file 
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The need for empirical work is particularly striking when it comes to 
obstructive effects. There has been no theoretician with the stature of 
Professor de Soto to take on the question of property information on 
thieves, so it is no surprise that no systematic examination of the 
magnitude of obstructive effects is to be found. Nonetheless, there are 
some tantalizing hints that the obstructive effect may be significant. 
Some locales, such as Lane County, Oregon, have reported a reduc-
tion in boat theft incidents as well as an impressively high recovery rate 
thanks to the establishment of a boat registry intended to reduce the 
number of boats thefts. According to the County Sheriff, “Boat theft 
reports in Oregon are the lowest in decades, and the recovery rate for 
stolen boats is at an all-time high.”107 Impressively, the recovery rate in 
Lane County is roughly a third, which is two or three times higher than 
the national recovery rate that stands at ten to twenty percent.108 
Several European countries have launched stolen-phone databases 
in order to reduce the rate of cellphone theft in large cities. In the 
United Kingdom, the measure is credited with a twenty percent 
reduction in cellphone-related crime (from 10,000 cases to 8,000) be-
tween 2004 and 2012 even though the number of cellphones nearly 
doubled in that period.109 The perceived success of the registry has 
prompted calls to force cellphone providers in the United States, where 
cellphone-related crime has gone up in recent years, to adopt a similar 
measure.110 
But the most detailed data on what we term the obstructive function 
of registries comes from Norway. Bicycle theft has become so widespread 
in Norway that stolen bicycles have become a currency of exchange 
among thieves.111 In the early 1990s, the number of thefts skyrocketed to 
100,000 per year, and stolen bicycles were resold for five to ten percent of 
                                                                                                                           
with the Columbia Law Review) (“Evaluation efforts have been frustrated by problems 
related to the inappropriate documentation of existing systems and the absence of 
effective evaluation models.”). 
 106. Cf. Nicholas H. Stern, Foreword to Klaus W. Deininger, World Bank, Land 
Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction, at ix, ix (2003) (“[D]iscussions on land poli-
cies are often characterized by preconceived notions and ideological viewpoints rather 
than by careful analysis of the potential contribution of land policies to broader devel-
opment . . . .”). 
 107. Owners Can Reduce Boat Theft with Basic Steps, Lane Cty., Or., http:// 
lanecounty.org/Departments/Sheriff/PoliceServices/Pages/stolenboats.aspx [http://perma. 
cc/$H37-MV6J] (last visited Sept. 18, 2015). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Rolfe Winkler, Carriers Band to Fight Cellphone Theft, Wall St. J. (Apr. 9, 2012, 
10:52 PM), http://on.wsj.com/HYwctV (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 110. See id. (discussing success of United Kingdom program and noting calls for sim-
ilar registry programs to be implemented in United States and Canada). 
 111. Bicycle Theft in Norway, http://www.sykkeltyveri.no/bicycle_theft.html [http: 
//perma.cc/4PFA-39PF] (last modified May 28, 2005, 9:13 AM). 
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the original price.112 Following the implementation of a related registry, 
the annual number of stolen bikes in Norway fell from 100,000 in 1995 to 
60,000 in 2004.113 The bicycle thefts reported to the police were reduced 
from 26,577 to 19,141.114 The thefts reported to the insurance industry 
were reduced from 18,100 to 9,468, and their losses were reduced from 
NOK 70.8 million (roughly USD 12 million) to NOK 34.0 million (less 
than USD 6 million).115 
While the data is far from definitive, it does provide tentative sup-
port for the existence of positive facilitative and obstructive effects in 
property registries. 
II. REGISTRY STRATEGIES AND THE INFORMATION–ASSET PARADOX 
In Part I, we showed that registries function in multiple markets 
simultaneously. Registries add value to property rights by facilitating trans-
actions in licit markets and by obstructing transactions in illicit markets. 
A complementary feature of registries elaborated in this Part is that 
they inspire a tug-of-war among different market participants as they 
repeatedly take action to protect their ability to enjoy property benefits. 
Owners want the registries that best preserve their rights in order to best 
facilitate licit transactions and obstruct illicit transactions. Thieves and 
other nonconsensual takers, by contrast, want registries that fail to pre-
serve the rights of owners. In particular, thieves desire registries with the 
smallest obstructive effect on illicit transactions. The contradictory moti-
vations of owners and nonconsensual takers engender dynamic effects 
that have generally been overlooked by the extant scholarly literature. 
The information contained in registries drastically affects the ability to 
enjoy the benefits of property. Consequently, registries’ information 
shapes the behavior not only of owners and potential buyers (and other 
consensual users and possessors), but of all the private actors in the prop-
erty universe, including potential nonconsensual takers and users. Each 
set of parties seeks to manipulate the information to its advantage. 
It might seem that this observation adds little to our normative 
understanding of the regulation of information about title in property. 
On first impression, it appears that the conflict of interests between law-
ful owner and thief simply points toward the desirability of better regis-
tries with better verified data. Surprisingly, we show that this is not the 
case. Registries with better data do not necessarily have the greatest ob-
structive effect on illicit markets, and they may not result in the greatest 
property value. In some cases, the better the registry’s data, the greater 
the danger to the registered asset. This is because both owner and thief 
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are not necessarily interested in the fidelity of the information in the 
registry per se. Rather, both are interested in the degree to which the 
asset aligns with information about the asset and its owner. 
Consider, first, cases where information and asset are not stably 
aligned, or where thieves and other nonconsensual takers can reliably 
control either information or the configuration of an asset. For example, 
consider a registry for boats, where the registry records the ownership of 
every boat by an identity number built into the frame of every boat in 
nonremovable fashion. In this case, information and asset are stably 
aligned. However, imagine as well that the registry is maintained in a 
computer database that enjoys only minimal security and can be easily 
hacked. In this case, owners would realize little or no obstructive value 
from registries, and registries provide little or no additional stability in 
ownership. 
Conversely, if information and asset are stably aligned, and the 
owner can also reliably control both information and the configuration 
of an asset, owners can enjoy the greatest obstructive value of registries 
and therefore the greatest value in their assets. 
There is an important asymmetry here, however. For owners to enjoy 
the obstructive value of registries, they must ensure fidelity of all ele-
ments. For thieves, one weak link is enough. For instance, in our boat 
example, the weak link in the lack of database fidelity is enough to 
undermine the value of the registry for the owners. Paradoxically, the 
high quality of the information in the database will actually help the 
thieves. The comprehensiveness of the registry will make it easier for 
thieves to steal boats and sell them to third parties, as they can do so 
simply by tampering with the ownership data in the registry without ever 
taking possession of the vessel. 
Other times, where the identifying information can be easily re-
moved from assets, the existence of the registry actually encourages 
nonconsensual takers to undercut the alignment between asset and infor-
mation by defacing one or the other. Thus, in some cases, registries 
encourage destruction of valuable attributes of assets or information about 
them. 
The surprising result of this is that good registries can sometimes 
lead to adverse property results. We call this dynamic “the information–
asset paradox.” Unraveling this paradox, and understanding when and 
how registries help property value requires a close examination of the 
dynamic effects of registries. The existence of registries encourages both 
owners and potential takers of the property rights (whether consensual 
or nonconsensual takers) to play close heed to the relationship between 
information and asset. Unfortunately, since different actors have differ-
ent aims—owners, for example, want a close and stable relationship, 
while thieves do not—the different actors constantly compete to secure 
or upset the relationship between registered information and the under-
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lying asset. By examining the actions likely to be taken by both sides in 
this contest, we can understand the dynamic effects of registries and 
better analyze the utility of registries. 
In this Part, we explore the competing strategies of owner and non-
consensual takers, and explain the likely effects on information, asset, 
and the alignment between information and asset. We conclude this Part 
by noting the possibility that the roles (and corresponding strategies) of 
owners and nonconsensual takers may be flipped in some common and 
foreseeable circumstances. 
A. Strategies of Nonconsensual Takers 
For potential thieves, the world consists of many assets to which the 
thief has no legal right but that can nevertheless serve as a potential 
source of utility. A thief who looks at a car parked on the street, for 
instance, sees potential utility in joyrides (or other potential direct uses 
of the car by the thief) or in profits in fencing the car (i.e., the profits 
that can be realized by selling possession of the car in the market for 
stolen goods). The economic literature on property rights views such 
potential utility as an illicit but important component of the utility of 
“economic property rights.”116 Thieves can realize some of the utility of 
assets, and the utility that they can realize must be taken into account.117 
Of course, this is not something the authors view in a positive light. 
Society does not aim, and should not aim, to aid thieves.118 But un-
desirable though it may be, the potential utility of thieves is important 
because it affects the stability of licit property rights. Society must pay 
attention to the utility of thieves because the disutility of thievery is an 
important social aim.119 The less utility a thief is likely to realize from any 
given asset, the less likely he or she is to attempt to steal it. In turn, the 
more security enjoyed by the licit owner of property rights in an asset, the 
more the property rights are worth. 
In a world where registries provide readily available information 
about the legal provenance of an asset, would-be thieves (and other non-
consensual takers of assets) face an uphill battle. First, registries make it 
                                                                                                                           
 116. See Barzel, Economic Analysis, supra note 44, at 141–42 (using example of theft 
to illustrate distinction between economic and legal rights); Yoram Barzel, The Capture of 
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far more difficult for thieves to dispose of stolen items. Would-be buyers 
can consult registries and verify that the selling thief has no title to con-
vey. Second, registries can make it more difficult for the thief to utilize 
the item on his or her own. The item might be recognized as stolen, and 
the thief might be exposed. For instance, a thief who joyrides in a car 
may get caught if observed by a police officer who compares the license 
plate number to the information in a registry of stolen cars. 
Realizing this, thieves can take precautionary measures to protect 
the utility they expect to realize from their illicit trade. Thieves need only 
worry about getting caught if information is readily available and veri-
fied, and if the information is likely to compromise the thieves’ expected 
gain. This means that thieves can protect their expected utility by blunt-
ing the expected adverse effects of truthful information. Thieves can take 
measures to reduce the likelihood of getting caught by creating mis-
matches between the description of assets in registries and their appear-
ance in the real world. This can be achieved by changing the defining 
characteristics of the asset or by manipulating the information in the 
relevant registry. 
Concretely, nonconsensual takers employ three strategies to compro-
mise the value of registries to owners. The first is to reconfigure the assets 
themselves in order to cause misalignment between the new form of asset 
and the information about the assets in their old form. One example of 
this strategy is the operation of “chop” shops, where cars are dismem-
bered into spare parts that are then sold separately as “scrap.” Jewelry 
thieves may employ a similar strategy when they melt down their stolen 
pieces into precious metals. 
To fully appreciate the implications of asset reconfiguration, con-
sider recent initiatives around the world to establish registration systems 
for smartphones to combat rampant theft of these devices.120 At first 
blush, the case for a cellphone registry appears indisputable. Smart-
phones bear identification information and can be easily disabled by 
their manufacturers. However, the possibility that thieves may recon-
figure the stolen phones renders the analysis much more complicated 
and nuanced. Registration, even when coupled with remote disabling of 
the device, will not put an end to smartphone theft as long as thieves can 
turn a profit from taking the devices apart and selling the electronic 
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launch individual databases allowing consumers to report stolen cell phones and have 
them disabled). 
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components individually. Indeed, a comprehensive registration system 
would drive nonconsensual takers toward this strategy, making it virtually 
impossible for smartphone owners to retrieve their valuable devices. 
Of course, the manufacturers of smartphones and other electronic 
goods can decrease the profitability of this strategy by making it very 
difficult to take apart their devices. In the extreme, they can manufacture 
fully integrated devices that cannot be dismembered. But this would cre-
ate a second-order cost for rightful owners: It would dramatically increase 
the cost of repairs. At the end of the day, therefore, any decision regard-
ing the desirability of a smartphone registry requires policymakers to 
adopt a dynamic perspective that takes account of the full range of re-
sponses of consensual nontakers to the establishment of a registry. 
The second strategy employed by nonconsensual takers is to obscure 
the alignment between goods and information attesting to the legal 
rights in them. For instance, a car thief may replace the license plates of 
a car in order to cause law enforcement officers to misidentify the ve-
hicle. Thieves, in fact, routinely remove identifying numbers from stolen 
cars in order to reduce the possibility of matching the registry to the 
stolen asset.121 
The third strategy, and the most difficult for nonconsensual takers to 
employ, is to leave the asset and registry information about the asset 
intact, but to attempt to utilize the information in the registry to take 
control of ownership. In one version, nonconsensual takers may attempt 
to rewrite entries in the registry to show that they are the true owners. 
For instance, modern bank robbers may try to effect heists through 
entirely electronic means. Instead of physically entering a bank and 
demanding cash, the thieves may seek to hack into the data registry of 
accounts and reassign to themselves apparent ownership of assets that 
belong to others. Such electronic thefts, unfortunately, are possible in 
even the most sophisticated data systems. For instance, thieves in the 
European Union were recently able to hack into a Czech registry of car-
bon-dioxide emission allowances and reassign the rights to make it 
appear that they lawfully possessed allowances.122 
In a different version of this strategy, instead of hacking the registry 
to change information about the owners, the nonconsensual takers 
attempt to masquerade as the owners. The popular and dangerous fraud 
                                                                                                                           
 121. See Edward R. Kleemans, Organized Crime, Transit Crime, and Racketeering, 35 
Crime & Just. 163, 191–92 (2007) (explaining modus operandi of criminal organizations 
involved in illicit trafficking of stolen cars). 
 122. See Nathanial Gronewold & John J. Fialka, European Commission Halts Transfers 
of Carbon Emissions Allowances Until Thefts Are Sorted Out, N.Y. Times (Jan. 20, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/01/20/20climatewire-european-commission-halts-
transfers-of-carbo-22394.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting suspension 
of transfers of carbon-dioxide emission allowances pending investigation of “computer-
aided thievery [resulting in] the loss of 475,000 [emissions allowances] from a registry in 
the Czech Republic”). 
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known as “identity theft” involves nonconsensual takers appropriating 
enough personal information about an individual victim to allow them-
selves to convince keepers of registries, such as banks and credit card 
companies, that the takers are actually the individual in question.123 The 
identity thieves then use the false identities to obtain assets registered in 
the name of the victims.124 
Before concluding our analysis of nonconsensual takers’ strategies, 
we should note that none of these strategies is cost free, and costs will 
alter the choices of nonconsensual takers. 
We begin with the cost structure of nonconsensual takers’ illicit activ-
ity. No matter what the nonconsensual takers do to improve their 
chances of successful appropriation, they will have to invest some time, 
effort, or expense. Disfiguring assets can reduce the usefulness of the 
assets—the parts of a car, for instance, while still valuable, are generally 
less valuable than a fully functioning automobile—and demand expertise 
in the defacing. Forging informational interfaces, such as automobile li-
censes or certificates of authenticity, demands expertise and care. Hack-
ing into databases may require a great deal of expertise and time. 
Sometimes, these costs will be so large as to decisively protect the 
asset from theft. In some cases, these costs will deter thieves from taking 
items nonconsensually because the theft is no longer cost effective, or 
because similar items may be stolen at less cost. But in other cases, non-
consensual takers may still find theft worthwhile, notwithstanding the 
cost. Just as significantly for our purposes, the costs may be uneven, push-
ing nonconsensual takers to adopt a less costly strategy. For instance, 
where information is very secure, but the physical asset less so, thieves 
may find themselves increasingly interested in reconfiguring assets. The 
more secure car ownership databases are, the more attractive “chopping” 
cars is to thieves. Registries will therefore have uneven deterrence effects 
on illicit activities. Sometimes, instead of deterring theft, registries will 
just drive illicit activities into different channels. 
Indeed, in some cases, paradoxically, registries may increase certain 
kinds of illicit activities. This is because registries may make illicit posses-
sion look secure to buyers. When potential buyers examine the provi-
dence of ownership, they do so on the basis of the information they have. 
If ownership information is recorded in registries, potential buyers will 
generally rely on the information in registries to determine whether the 
seller is genuine. If thieves can take control of the information in the 
                                                                                                                           
 123. See Penelope N. Lazarou, Small Businesses and Identity Theft: Reallocating the 
Risk of Loss, 10 N.C. Banking Inst. 305, 308–09 (2006) (surveying multiple ways in which 
such identity thefts occur). 
 124. See Identity Theft, Dep’t of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ 
websites/idtheft.html [http://perma.cc/2ASW-NL38] (last updated Nov. 2, 2015) (listing 
ways in which thieves can leverage misappropriated identifying information to obtain 
assets in victims’ names). 
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registry, they can make their control of an asset look legitimate, and 
thereby enjoy the benefits of the registry’s facilitating function. 
B. Strategies of Owners 
Owners are not left without recourse when faced with the threat of 
strategic behavior by potential nonconsensual takers. They, too, can take 
steps to protect their rights. Owners have one great advantage over 
thieves: The law is on their side. As a result, owners can rely on the state 
to spread information about their licit rights through state-provided reg-
istries and also rely on other state-provided protections. But even without 
the assistance of state-provided registries, owners may take steps to pro-
tect their rights. In fact, the primary strategies for owners will be the 
opposite of nonconsensual takers. Owners will try to secure a stable align-
ment between registered information and legal rights, the accuracy of 
information about owners’ rights, and a favorable configuration of assets. 
In this section, we do not assume the existence of registries. Rather, 
we look at how owners might try to protect themselves, both in the pres-
ence and in the absence of registries. In the next section, we look at the 
way the owners’ strategies interplay with one another, particularly when 
there are registries recording property rights. We do this in order to 
highlight the separate roles of the owner in recording information and 
of the state in facilitating such recording. 
1. Reconfiguring Assets. — In the preceding section, we discussed how 
thieves change the makeup of assets in order to reduce the risk of appre-
hension.125 In this section, we show that owners, too, employ a similar 
strategy. However, there is a critical difference between the two cases: 
thieves reconfigure assets ex post, after the theft; owners do so ex ante to 
prevent theft. 
By reconfiguring their assets, owners can make them less attractive 
to illicit takers. For instance, owners may prefer that automobile stereos 
be electronically coded so that they can only operate while connected to 
the correct automobile. Likewise, owners of bicycles may prefer versions 
that do not have “quick release” parts so as to prevent thieves from 
stealing pieces of the bicycle. 
The owners’ interest in blocking thieves may lead to an extreme and 
counterintuitive strategy for configuring assets: damaging their own 
goods or acquiring lower quality goods ab initio. In his classical article, 
The Rhino’s Horn: Incomplete Property Rights and the Optimal Value of an 
Asset,126 Professor Douglas Allen compiles examples of cases in which this 
strategy may be employed. 
                                                                                                                           
 125. See supra section II.A (setting forth strategies and incentives of nonconsensual 
takers). 
 126. Douglas W. Allen, The Rhino’s Horn: Incomplete Property Rights and the 
Optimal Value of an Asset, 31 J. Legal Stud. S339 (2002). 
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Professor Allen’s article was inspired by the plight of the black rhino 
in Africa. Poachers have driven the population of the black rhino to the 
point of extinction, leading conservationists to think of possible solutions 
to save the animal. Tragically, poachers are not interested in the rhinos in 
their entirety. They hunt the rhinos down for one reason only: the rhi-
no’s horn. As it turns out, the horn can be used for the manufacturing of 
various functional and ornamental objects, and legend has it that the 
horn has various medical and spiritual properties.127 Poachers who are 
indifferent to the fate of rhinos kill the rhinos solely in order to saw off 
the horn. The rhino’s horn thus became the bane of the black rhino’s 
existence.128 Professor Allen and others suggested that the black rhino 
could be saved if its horn were surgically removed by environmental 
organizations.129 The rhino can easily survive without its horn—indeed, it 
is of very little use to it—but in the sad reality that emerged in Africa, the 
rhino cannot survive with it.130 
This observation led Professor Allen to a more general insight. Prop-
erty owners may be better off damaging or compromising their own as-
sets if by doing so they make them less attractive to thieves.131 Two ex-
amples illustrate this possibility. The first is the removal of stereo systems 
from cars by owners, or, in some cases, the installation of inferior-quality 
stereos. Owners find this damage to their own utility worthwhile when 
the car will be parked in areas where car-radio theft is rampant. By instal-
ling a cheap stereo, the car owner compromises the enjoyment she 
derives from driving the car. However, this reduction in utility is out-
weighed by the utility of being secure in the knowledge that her radio 
will not get stolen and that her car will not be damaged in the process. 
A second example is bicycles. Multiple students in urban campuses 
choose to ride average and even below-average-quality bicycles in order 
to avoid falling prey to the predation of bicycle thieves.132 In this case, 
                                                                                                                           
 127. See id. at S348 (“Although the horn is used to decorate ceremonial dagger 
handles in the Middle East, its chief use is in Asian medicine, where it is ground into a 
powder for the relief of fevers.”). 
 128. See id. at S349 (“[B]lack rhinos numbered between 65,000 and 100,000 in 1970; 
today, population estimates are between 3,000 and 4,000.”). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. at S348–50 (“Dehorning . . . does not hurt the rhino . . . and it appears 
that the policy has reduced poaching.”). 
 131. See id. at S347–48 (suggesting such actions are rational where “costs of enforcing 
the property right decrease by more than the value of the property right”). 
 132. Riding cheaper, used bicycles is an effective way to avoid bicycle theft. See 
Frederika Whitehead, Bike Thief Tells How to Stop Your Cycle from Being Stolen, 
Guardian: Green Living Blog (Sept. 13, 2010, 2:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/green-living-blog/2010/sep/13/bike-thief-stolen-tips [http://perma.cc/D7S5-
GKCN] (recommending bicycle owners buy cheaper bikes because bicycle thieves 
frequently target expensive bikes and monitor locations where expensive bikes are 
regularly parked). 
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too, the owner voluntarily agrees to give up a certain level of enjoyment 
in exchange for greater security of possession. 
The rationale behind the owners’ actions in both cases—the car 
stereo case and the bicycle case—is the same. The sacrifice made by the 
owner, while diminishing the value to her, effects an even greater dimi-
nution of value to a potential thief. 
Asset configurations that foil thieves need not be extremely harmful 
to the owner. Many times, assets are structured to have simple security 
systems that owners can manage more easily than thieves. Automobiles 
have keys and sometimes electronic codes. Computers and telephones 
can be programmed to operate only after the entry of a password. 
Sometimes, asset configurations are designed to protect the integrity 
of registrations. Cellular telephones, for instance, may have identification 
numbers coded into the software so that stolen cellphones can be iden-
tified.133 Vehicle identification numbers (VINs) are placed in auto-
mobiles in multiple locations in order to ensure that the numbers cannot 
be easily removed.134 These methods do not directly affect the function-
ing of the asset. The car drives in exactly the same fashion no matter 
where, and in how many locations, the VIN is located. However, the more 
secure the VIN, the harder it is to separate the asset (the automobile) 
from the information that is the key to successful registration (the VIN). 
2. Managing Information. — Aside from minding the configuration of 
assets themselves, owners can take other steps to protect their property 
rights through managing registered information. Thus, a second expec-
ted focus of owners’ efforts is to secure the accuracy of information about 
owners’ rights. For instance, owners will try to ensure that their owner-
ship of a piece of land is properly registered in the local land registry or 
recorder of deeds. The vitality of this strategy is obvious, but it is not 
always easy to implement. 
Several factors confound the accuracy of information in registries. 
To begin with, the act of registration is not costless. While presumably 
most owners in most circumstances will feel that the benefits of regis-
tration exceed the costs, it is at least theoretically possible that some 
owners will feel the investment is not worth it. This concern is partic-
ularly acute with respect to some kinds of intellectual property regis-
tration. Consider, for instance, the registration of a patent. In order to 
                                                                                                                           
 133. See Steve Gold, Cracking GSM, Network Security, Apr. 2011, at 12, 14 (noting 
many cellphones are programmed with “device-specific . . . unique codes” which can be 
used for identification of mobile devices). 
 134. See Jill Liphart, How to Prevent Car Theft, Quote Wizard (June 29, 2015), 
http://quotewizard.com/auto-insurance/prevent-car-theft [http://perma.cc/XEK5-5MKH] 
(“Displaying the designated Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) on as many major parts 
of a vehicle as possible makes it difficult for thieves to part-out stolen cars.”); see generally 
VIN Decoder, Research Maniacs, http://researchmaniacs.com/VIN/VIN-Decoder.html 
[http://perma.cc/D669-YKTZ] (last visited Nov. 3, 2015) (detailing process of creating 
VINs). 
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maximize the chances that a registered patent will be considered valid, 
the inventor should search prior patents (and other publications) in 
order to determine the prior art and know what parts of the invention 
can legitimately be considered novel and patentable.135 The need to en-
gage in significant searches prior to registration greatly increases the cost 
of recording information in the registry; if the patent revenues are not 
expected to be significant enough, the inventor will not find registration 
to be cost effective. Copyright registration poses a related but converse 
challenge. Under the Copyright Act, registration is optional: Owners 
must register only if they wish to commence an infringement suit; 
otherwise, they are not legally compelled to register their works.136 
Consequently, most copyrighted works are not registered and the public 
has no way of knowing whether a particular work is copyrighted or not. 
While registration is relatively low in cost, the benefit of registration is 
extremely low until the owner is ready to commence a lawsuit. Thus, 
many copyright owners do not find registration to be cost effective. 
Second, information about rights is not constant. For instance, while 
the purchaser of Blackacre may take care to register all the information 
about her purchase at the time of the transaction, numerous events will 
occur over time to render the information incomplete. Workers may ob-
tain mechanics’ liens. The municipality may acquire a tax lien. The own-
er may negotiate the creation of binding covenants with neighbors. The 
owner may marry and bestow a share in the property upon her spouse. 
Owners may die and leave property as an inheritance to heirs. If owners 
wish to keep the registrations up to date, they must constantly keep 
themselves apprised of the information recorded in the registry and 
supplement or correct it. 
Third, even if owners are perfectly vigilant, they may not be able to 
perfect the information in the registry. Some registries are set up not to 
accommodate certain information. Land registries may register deeds, 
for instance, but not inchoate spousal claims based on theories of marital 
property. They may register liens, but not real covenants. Registries are 
not selective about their information simply in order to be difficult. It is 
costly to maintain registries and to verify information. Registries manage 
these costs by being selective about the information they contain. 
Fourth, even where willing owners meet willing registrars, the regis-
tries may not succeed in maintaining perfect accuracy of information. 
Most information about property rights favors some parties at the ex-
                                                                                                                           
 135. See, e.g., Long, Information Costs, supra note 1, at 499 (noting in order to obtain 
patent protection inventor must prove, inter alia, “how the invention is different from 
others in the field (the prior art)”). 
 136. See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485, 494 
(2004) (pointing out registration is no longer prerequisite for obtaining copyright 
protection and is required only for “initiation of an infringement action”); see also 17 
U.S.C. § 410(c) (2012) (outlining role of “certificate of registration” in copyright infringe-
ment suits). 
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pense of others. If Susan establishes her mechanics’ lien over Thomas’s 
Blackacre, she is better off, but Thomas is worse off. This potentially 
places owners in conflict with other actors, leaving registries in the 
uncomfortable position of deciding between them.137 In some cases, 
neither Susan nor Thomas possesses perfect knowledge of the facts and 
law, and even if they do, they may choose not to share that knowledge 
with the registry. Adjudicating the relative strengths of competing claims 
will often be costly and beyond the scope of officials managing a registry. 
Indeed, even without competitors over registry claims, information is not 
free and not always readily available. The owner may simply not have 
enough verifiable information about predecessors in title or other vital 
facts for her claim to warrant registration. 
Fifth, and finally, owners may elect not to register their rights for 
privacy reasons.138 Some owners may not want the rest of the world to 
know of the full extent of their possessions. This explains the presence of 
so many anonymous bidders in art auctions. In some cases, the pref-
erence for privacy (or secrecy) may be a personality trait or an idio-
syncratic preference. In other cases, it may be driven by practical con-
cerns. For example, an art collector may refrain from registering her 
ownership of a famous painting out of fear that doing so may “invite” 
others to steal it from her. 
For all these reasons, even the best registries are imperfect. And not 
all registries even try to be perfect. The degree to which such registries 
can succeed will naturally depend on the ability of the managers of the 
registry to convince owners to participate, as well as the ability to verify 
information. Enforcement powers can therefore be critical to the success 
of a registry. Many private registration systems will be of limited utility, as 
they will lack the ability to cajole or force centralization of information.139 
Even state registration systems may suffer from such problems.140 This is 
one of the reasons title insurance and other legal means of protecting 
                                                                                                                           
 137. Mechanics’ liens are a particularly apt example insofar as they can be registered 
automatically and do not require court approval. Yet even in those cases where registration 
is not automatic and requires the administrator of the registry to turn to a court or 
tribunal for guidance, indirect costs are imposed on the parties in the course of resolving 
the competing claims. 
 138. Arguably, issues of privacy are among the disputed items in the bitter controversy 
about registration of private ownership of firearms. 
 139. Cf. Kimball Foster, Certificates of Possessory Title: A Sensible Addition to 
Minnesota’s Successful Torrens System, 40 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 112, 113–14 (2013) 
(chronicling Minnesota’s implementation of Torrens public registration system and sub-
sequent gains in public confidence due to enforcement powers wielded and effectively put 
to use by panoply of judges, examiners, and registrars). 
 140. See Charles Szypszak, Public Registries and Private Solutions: An Evolving 
American Real Estate Conveyance Regime, 24 Whittier L. Rev. 663, 680 (2003) (“The 
American Torrens system’s limitations have resulted in its abandonment in several states, 
and very infrequent use in others. In those states that enacted registration systems, 
registration was voluntary, allowing parties to a conveyance to opt for the traditional 
system.”). 
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against flaws in information systems persist even in the presence of state-
provided registries.141 
3. Aligning Information and Asset. — A third likely aim of owners will 
be to secure a stable alignment between registered information and legal 
rights. Physically aligning title information and asset is a simple and intui-
tive strategy that owners often adopt, though not uniformly with all as-
sets. Perhaps the simplest version of this strategy is the practice of writing 
one’s name in a book or sewing it into a jacket. More sophisticated ver-
sions of alignment seek to permanently etch into an asset the identifying 
features that will also appear in a property registry. For example, vehicle 
identity numbers for cars may be electronically coded into the engine as 
well as machine-stamped in several places in the automobile.142 
Realty has been the realm of many interesting and successful efforts 
to stably align information and asset. One can divide these efforts into 
two categories: legal and technological. 
The most important legal change that has improved the alignment 
of information and asset is the Torrens system of land registration. Sir 
Robert Richard Torrens is generally credited with having created the 
Torrens system, first adopted in South Australia in 1858.143 Prior to the 
Torrens system, land registries recorded documents attesting to land 
transfers.144 For instance, if Alice sold land to Beatrice, the buyer and 
seller would take the deed to the relevant recordation office, which 
would thereafter maintain a copy of the deed. Each deed would carry a 
nonstandardized description of the land covered in the transaction. The 
Torrens system reverses matters. In the Torrens system, it is the land that 
is registered, rather than the transaction. The Torrens system is based on 
                                                                                                                           
 141. Id. at 686–92 (mapping benefits of title insurance and suggesting it achieves same 
results as Torrens system at far lesser cost); see also John L. McCormack, Torrens and 
Recording: Land Title Assurance in the Computer Age, 18 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 61, 121–
23 (1992) (pressing for retention of recording system coupled with title assurance and 
computerization as means of importing many of perceived benefits of public registration 
system). 
 142. See How OBDII Helps You When Buying a Used Car, Scantool Garage (May 7, 
2012), http://www.obdautodoctor.com/scantool-garage/how-obdii-helps-you-when-buying 
-a-used-car/ [http://perma.cc/2BQ8-63GD] (noting VIN can be retrieved from engine 
through on-board diagnostic  software); What You Need to Know About VIN Etching, Ellis 
& Salazar Garage & Body Shop (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.ellisandsalazar.com/what-you-
need-to-know-about-vin-etching/ [http://perma.cc/K7SK-NS78] (describing purpose and 
process of VIN etching). 
 143. Blair C. Schick & Irving H. Plotkin, Torrens in the United States: A Legal and 
Economic History and Analysis of American Land-Registration Systems 17 (1978); A.G. 
Lang, Computerised Land Title and Land Information, 10 Monash U. L. Rev. 196, 197 
(1984). 
 144. See Szypszak, supra note 140, at 664–71 (surveying features and risks of 
“conveyance recording” systems). 
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a map of area covered by the registry.145 When one wants to record a sale 
of land, instead of writing up and recording a deed that describes the 
asset to be transferred, one records the transfer of a certificate that refers 
to a plot of land already described in the Torrens map.146 The transaction 
is then reported to and certified by the relevant state authorities. Once 
the transaction is certified, ownership according to the Torrens regis-
tration cannot be challenged, though persons wrongly deprived of own-
ership may have a claim against a dedicated state fund for errors in 
Torrens registrations.147 
The advantages of the Torrens system are clear when one compares 
the difficulty of verifying title under the different registry systems. Under 
the old recordation system, if Beatrice the purchaser wanted to verify 
that Alice the seller had good title to Blackacre, Beatrice would have to 
search for deeds in Alice’s chain of title. She would hunt for a deed 
where Alice was the buyer, note the name of the seller, and then hunt for 
the deed where that seller originally bought the property. Beatrice would 
search from deed to deed until she had established a chain of title. 
Beatrice would then follow the chain forward in time, and it would 
hopefully lead back to Alice.148 Misfiled deeds,149 “wild deeds,”150 and any 
number of other phenomena might lead Beatrice to conclude that Alice 
had good title, even though she did not.151 By contrast, under the 
Torrens system, Beatrice’s examination is quick and easy. To transfer 
Blackacre, Alice would have to hand over to Beatrice a certificate that 
identifies Blackacre and Alice as Blackacre’s owner. Beatrice need merely 
go to the registry and check that the certificate is genuine—i.e., that 
Alice really is the registered owner of Blackacre as described in the 
certificate.152 
                                                                                                                           
 145. Tim Hanstad, Designing Land Registration Systems for Developing Countries, 13 
Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 647, 651–52 (explaining how maps are integral to systems of land 
registration). 
 146. D.H. Van Doren, Current Legislation, The Torrens System of Land Title 
Registration, 17 Colum. L. Rev. 354, 355 (1917). 
 147. McCormack, supra note 141, at 81–83 (discussing various indemnification 
methods provided under Torrens land registration system). 
 148. For a description of title searches under deed systems, see id. at 67–69. 
 149. See id. at 69 (“[R]ecorded, apparently valid transaction[s] may be void or defec-
tive.”); see also Barry Goldner, The Torrens System of Title Registration: A New Proposal 
for Effective Implementation, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 661, 666–67 (1982) (listing common 
causes of misfiled deeds). 
 150. See Emily Bayer-Pacht, The Computerization of Land Records: How Advances in 
Recording Systems Affect the Rationale Behind Some Existing Chain of Title Doctrine, 32 
Cardozo L. Rev. 337, 346–47 (2010) (describing wild deed doctrine). 
 151. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 667 (discussing difficulty of determining validity 
of deed solely on basis of examination of record). 
 152. See William C. Niblack, Pivotal Points in the Torrens System, 24 Yale L.J. 274, 276 
(“The declaration of the indefeasibility of the title as registered, of the conclusiveness of a 
certificate of title, is absolutely essential to the working of the Torrens system.”). 
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Thus, with the simple expedient of a central map, the Torrens sys-
tem tightly aligns asset with information. Under the Torrens system, land 
parcels are locked into a configuration by a map, while registration infor-
mation is keyed to the same map. 
The Torrens system is even more valuable when combined with a 
common reform that has generally accompanied Torrens registration sys-
tems. As noted earlier, land parcels are commonly circumscribed in one 
of two systems. In the metes-and-bounds system, land parcels can be 
irregular in shape, and they are circumscribed by features of the land 
and measures described in a deed or other document.153 The rectangular 
system, by contrast, describes land by coordinates on a common map.154 
It should immediately be clear that many jurisdictions that adopted a 
Torrens system of registration also found it advantageous to adopt a 
rectangular system of parcelization.155 The same map can serve as the 
basis of the rectangular parcelization and of the Torrens registration. To 
be sure, not all regions with rectangular parcels use Torrens registration, 
and not all Torrens jurisdictions feature rectangular parcels.156 Nonethe-
less, because Torrens systems and rectangular systems often go together, 
Torrens jurisdictions can frequently benefit from both advantageous as-
set configurations and from the tight alignment between asset and infor-
mation. 
Technology provides new and improved means of aligning land 
assets with information about title. GPS technology, along with the prolif-
eration of excellent maps available via the Internet, makes it possible for 
nearly every buyer and seller to verify the precise boundaries of land par-
cels, even if the parcels are not rectangular. We can predict that as infor-
mation technology improves, the ability to align the configuration of 
land parcels and information about property rights will only increase. 
C. Changing Roles 
To this point, we have assumed a fairly benign picture of owner and 
nonconsensual taker. These roles, however, may be more complicated. 
There are times when the owner is not interested in protecting formal 
title, but rather, is interested in possession only. Likewise, there are times 
when the nonconsensual taker wants to protect the formal title, in order 
to establish her own title. 
                                                                                                                           
 153. Stephen V. Estopinal, A Guide to Understanding Land Surveys 93–94 (3d ed. 
2009). 
 154. Id. at 103–05. 
 155. Hanstad, supra note 145, at 677–78 (explaining how Torrens system facilitates 
Cadastral maps, which in turn make parcelization easier). 
 156. Id. at 670–71 (pointing out little of Torrens system finds applicability in United 
States, which prefers land recordation or registration of deeds system). This is despite 
widespread deployment of the Rectangular Survey method here. 
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To see this, consider the example of an owner who finds himself in 
debt and possibly subject to enforcement actions by a creditor. Until he 
ran into trouble, the owner would have sought good title information in 
order to protect his ownership interests in assets. However, under threat 
of repossession, the owner will seek to hide assets from the creditor, and 
therefore aim to obscure or destroy title information. The creditor’s 
interests, too, are unlike those of the usual nonconsensual taker. She 
seeks to use legal proceedings to acquire assets to repay the debt. The 
closer the debtor moves to insolvency, the greater the creditor’s interest 
in protecting formal title and information about that title. It is this 
dynamic that drives much of the law of bankruptcy. This dynamic leads, 
in its extremes, to a reversal of roles. The owner seeks to destroy the 
interface between title information and asset, while the potential non-
consensual taker seeks to preserve it. 
Insolvency is not the only circumstance in which this inversion of the 
usual incentives can occur. Taxes, for instance, can place the state tax 
collector in the role of nonconsensual taker who seeks good title infor-
mation, with the owner, again, seeking to obscure that information. 
III. WHEN THE STATE COMES MARCHING IN 
Until now we have paid little attention to the distinct role of the 
state as a regulator. In this Part, we introduce the role of the state and 
examine how the state affects the strategies of the various players in the 
game of information about property rights. 
A. The Two Roles of the State 
We begin with the obvious: The state takes sides in the battle be-
tween owners and nonconsensual takers. The state generally aims not 
only to raise the value of property rights, but also to ensure that the value 
of such rights is enjoyed by the legal owners rather than nonconsensual 
takers.157 This means that, in general, the state seeks to complement the 
strategies owners take to defend the security of their rights. However, the 
power of the state regarding registries is so great that it can help and 
harm owners at the same time. To see this, return to our earlier obser-
vation that registries add value to property rights by facilitating transfers 
among owners and voluntary takers, and by obstructing illicit deprivations 
of title by involuntary takers. The state’s actions create countervailing 
effects. By enhancing the power of registries, for instance, the state may 
increase their facilitative value while reducing their obstructive value. 
                                                                                                                           
 157. The state, of course, may have ulterior motives in its management of registries or 
title information. The state may collect title information in order to make it easier to 
collect taxes related to the asset or transactions in the asset. Alternatively, or additionally, 
the state may gather and disseminate title information in order to serve other regulatory 
goals. These motives are certainly important for a full analysis of registries, though they 
are beyond the scope of our analysis. 
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This surprising observation about the state’s powers stems from the 
fact that property disputes must be resolved on the basis of imperfect 
information. Often, multiple claimants to an asset can point to evidence 
indicating they have ownership. For instance, Jack may claim ownership 
of Blackacre on the basis of proven possession for many years, while Jill 
claims ownership on the basis of a deed of sale from a known previous 
owner. When the state resolves such cases by vindicating the ownership 
claim of one of the claimants, it necessarily effaces the competing owner-
ship claim of the other claimant. Any rule of evidence chosen by the state 
facilitates ownership based on some kinds of evidence and therefore 
necessarily privileges certain kinds of information by allowing it to trump 
imperfect property claims. 
Even without registries, the state can, and often does, use infor-
mation about certain aspects of property as a route to perfect title and 
defeat otherwise potentially valid claims of title. Doctrines of adverse 
possession provide the most outstanding example. Adverse possession 
grants perfect title to a property claimant who can prove uninterrupted 
possession for the requisite period of time, notwithstanding the existence 
of a competing “true” owner with better prior title.158 
Similar doctrines are often associated with registries. For instance, in 
some states (so-called “race states”), where the owner of Blackacre sells 
the property to two buyers in succession, the state grants title to 
Blackacre to the subsequent purchaser, even though the seller had 
already given up title by the time of the sale, as long as the subsequent 
buyer is the first to record the sale in the registry.159 
The result is that the state plays two roles when it maintains a 
property registry. The first and most obvious role of the state is that of 
“service provider” of information about title. The state provides a single 
registry service that almost always benefits from economies of scale that 
lower the cost of centralized registries run by a single provider. 
Second, and more importantly, the state determines the legal conse-
quences of registering and failing to register. The state does not need to 
restrict its role in registration to simply recording information. The state 
can step beyond a narrow role and assign legal consequence to regis-
tration. In race states, for instance, the state functionally adjusts property 
title to fit the information in the registry.160 Once complete, the regis-
                                                                                                                           
 158. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies 190 (2d 
ed. 2012) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Principles and Policies] (describing principle of 
adverse possession). 
 159. See id. at 921–22 (explaining how race statutes work). 
 160. See id. at 918 (noting state registration results in constructive notice “as a matter 
of law,” which can block good faith purchaser claims by subsequent transferees); Ray E. 
Sweat, Race, Race-Notice and Notice Statutes: The American Recording System, Prob. & 
Prop., May–June 1989, at 27, 28 (explaining race states allow first recorder to acquire 
property title). 
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tration of property rights can divest title from a prior holder and grant 
title to the newly registered owner.161 
In the literature, the two potential functions of the state—recorder 
of rights, or arbiter of titles—are referred to as recordation and regis-
tration, respectively.162 In a recordation system, a land registry is limited 
to recording information about who claims to own Blackacre.163 In the 
registration system, the state potentially makes ownership of Blackacre 
contingent on the information in the registry.164 A recording scheme 
might place every deed concerning Blackacre in the registry without de-
termining the legal consequence of those deeds.165 Even if potential 
buyers of Blackacre conducted a thorough title search and purchased 
title insurance, they would still have to face the possibility that a record-
ing error might defeat their title.166 By contrast, if the state acted as a 
“true” registrar, its record of title to Blackacre would be definitive.167 
Once a buyer of Blackacre confirmed that the seller was the registered 
titleholder in the registry, the buyer could be certain of the seller’s ability 
to transfer title. No private title insurance would be necessary.168 
When the state acts as a registrar and rewrites property rights in 
accordance with the information in registries, it lowers the cost of volun-
tary transactions by reducing the need to search for information. Yet, at 
                                                                                                                           
 161. Merrill & Smith, Principles and Policies, supra note 158, at 918; Sweat, supra note 
160, at 28 (observing race states will protect title of subsequent purchaser who is first to 
record even where subsequent purchaser is aware of earlier conveyance). 
 162. See, e.g., Benito Arruñada & Nuno Garoupa, The Choice of Titling System in 
Land, 48 J.L. & Econ. 709, 710–12 (2005) (drawing distinction between recordation and 
registration systems); Hanstad, supra note 145, at 670–71, 673–74 (same); Lueck & Miceli, 
supra note 50, at 214–17 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (same). 
 163. See McCormack, supra note 141, at 68 (“[T]he acceptance of an instrument for 
recordation does not usually reflect a governmental judgment that the instrument is 
legally effective [because] the government is merely a depository of copies of the 
instruments . . . .”). 
 164. Id. at 80 (pointing out statement of ownership contained in certificate is intend-
ed to function as “mirror” of true state of title). 
 165. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 667 (observing with respect to recording systems 
“validity of a deed cannot be determined from a review of the record”); Hanstad, supra 
note 145, at 670–71 (“The conventional recording system makes no averments . . . about 
the state of the title to any parcel of land.”). 
 166. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 666–67 (describing “several ways in which a cloud 
of uncertainty hangs over a recorded title”). 
 167. Hanstad, supra note 145, at 673 (“Under land title registration, a certificate of 
title . . . provides conclusive evidence of the land rights pertaining to a particular land 
parcel.”). 
 168. Goldner, supra note 149, at 669–70 (“Adopting a title registration system would 
necessarily involve a major cutback, if not the complete dismantling, of the title assurance 
industry.”). An important feature of U.S. versions of the Torrens system is that they have 
offered alternative state insurance of the validity of titles certified through the Torrens 
registration procedure. This state insurance has been costly and highly controversial. See 
Powell, supra note 73, at 72–73 (surveying exhaustion of various state assurance funds used 
to satisfy title-error claims). 
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the same time, the definitive nature of a registry may make theft easier in 
some cases. If Clarice can successfully counterfeit the information in the 
registry to record herself as the “owner,” she can acquire a transferable 
title to the property. In this sense, the registry inadvertently facilitates 
theft and lowers the barrier to nonconsensual taking. 
B. The Optimal State Registry 
The dual-edged nature of the state’s power allows us to show that the 
state’s optimal approach can be boiled down to three simple rules. 
First, states should view registries as most valuable when there is a 
tight alignment between the description of the assets in a registry and 
their actual configuration in the real world. If the state can confidently 
predict that that alignment will be maintained—as is the case for in-
stance in famous and valuable works of art—then registries have the 
greatest facilitative and obstructive value.169 By contrast, if the good in 
question is difficult to fix in form and description—for instance, if it is a 
nondescript crate of widgets—there is little point in a registry.170 
Second, registries should only be empowered to rewrite property 
rights when it is clear that the gains from clearing away potential com-
peting invalid claims outweigh the losses entailed in eliminating poten-
tial valid claims. The balance between these gains and losses depends 
upon the reliability of the information that can be expected in the regis-
try. Reliable information facilitates transactions by the owner; less reliable 
information may aid transactions of thieves and other takers. In other 
words, the possibility of inaccurate information may lead to a situation 
where the facilitative function of registries can clash with the obstructive 
function. Even with imperfect information, the guarantees offered by 
“true” registries will still assist owners in transacting and thereby produce 
facilitative gains for society. However, if thieves can manipulate registries 
with false information, the registry might work to “launder” takings and 
grant good title to the successors of involuntary takers. Consequently, the 
registry can produce a negative obstructive effect; it might actually help 
rather than hinder thieves. The desirability of having legal rights con-
form to the registry, therefore, depends on a variety of factors, such as 
the cost of independently verifying information, the credibility of infor-
mation in the registry, the vulnerability of the registry to information 
favoring nonvoluntary takers, and the size of the market for the asset 
without the registry. 
                                                                                                                           
 169. Professor Shavell describes registries as most useful when assets are durable and 
valuable. Shavell, supra note 9, at 49–50. 
 170. Professors Jackson and Baird make the same point about grain in a silo. See Baird 
& Jackson, Uncertainty and Transfer, supra note 57, at 306–07 (“[A] title-based recording 
system is much harder to organize for grain in a silo . . . [because] [o]ne has no easy way 
of knowing that this was the grain grown on Blackacre in one jurisdiction . . . [or that] . . . 
the grain in the silo today was the grain that was there yesterday.”). 
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Third, in considering what information to include in the registry—
or, indeed, whether to maintain a registry at all—the state must take into 
account not only start-up costs, but also the tradeoff between compre-
hensiveness and accuracy. A registration system that only updates records 
when it receives evidence ensuring a high degree of accuracy can guaran-
tee that the information located within the registry can be relied upon. 
At the same time, this demand for accuracy comes with a cost. Evidence 
is not costless, and the more evidence the state registry demands, the 
more owners must invest in proving their ownership. These costs will in-
evitably drive some properties out of the registration system. Owners will 
examine the cost of producing the necessary evidence and weigh it 
against the benefits produced by registration, and they may find that reg-
istration is simply not worth it. In some cases, moreover, registration may 
not even be available, as the owner simply lacks the ability to provide the 
evidence required by the registry. Conversely, a registry that relaxes ev-
identiary standards can encourage more registrations. With lower costs of 
obtaining evidence, owners will find it more worthwhile to register prop-
erty rights. However, the lower evidentiary standards will almost certainly 
lead to lower quality records. Poorer information will lead to less reliable 
registries. 
We now explain our reasoning behind each of these conclusions. 
1. Aligning Title Information and Asset. — As we noted in Part II, 
information about title to property is subject to a constant tug-of-war 
between owners and potential involuntary takers. Takers have a variety of 
methods for trying to hide the true title information about assets. Jewelry 
can be disassembled and precious metals melted; cars can be “chopped” 
and sold for parts. Land, on the other hand, is much more difficult to 
mask and reconfigure. Takers will focus their efforts on assets that are 
vulnerable in their alignment between description and actual physical 
configuration. The assets that are most amenable to registries are those 
whose alignment is stable. If the state cannot be certain of the stability of 
assets and information about them, a registry can be counterproductive. 
One important implication is that assets cannot be treated uniformly 
when it comes to registries. As Professor Shavell notes, in some cases 
assets will simply not be valuable enough to warrant the cost of regis-
tries.171 But for highly unstable assets, our analysis shows that it will be 
difficult to maintain a viable registry even though title information might 
potentially be extremely valuable. This is easiest to see in the context of 
intellectual property. Given the nature of intellectual property, it is often 
difficult or impossible for owners to effectively imprint indicia of their 
ownership on their assets. This undermines the ability of registries to tie 
title information effectively to assets. The problem of online piracy is so 
intractable precisely because it is difficult to mark assets in the digital 
                                                                                                                           
 171. Shavell, supra note 9, at 50 (listing “radios, televisions, and similar items” as assets 
not warranting registration). 
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realm. Two distinct, yet connected, phenomena combine to produce this 
result. The first, and oft-discussed, is the ease with which new digital 
copies can be produced.172 The second, which arises from our analysis, is 
the inability of rightholders to mark their assets in a stable manner, 
impervious to manipulation. 
In the online realm, copyright notices can easily be removed or 
effaced. Similarly, information about the owner may be deleted or alter-
ed.173 Once all ownership-relevant information is removed, noncon-
sensual users can forge ahead and reproduce the work without any tell-
tale signs, giving unsuspecting third parties the impression that the work 
is “unowned.” It is noteworthy that the actions taken by nonconsensual 
takers simultaneously benefit the takers and undermine the ability of 
copyright owners to transact with willing third parties. In this highly com-
promised informational environment, willing transactors must bear two 
costs as well. First, they often do not know the identity of the rightful 
rightholder. Second, they must bear high verification costs even in those 
cases where the correct information appears, as there is always a risk that 
information that appears on digital files is incorrect. It is therefore not 
surprising that not only is online piracy rampant, vulnerable industries 
have suffered measurable losses. 
The state may attempt to combat instability with auxiliary legal pro-
tections. Once again, copyright provides an interesting example. One of 
the provisions of the controversial Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 
1998 was an effort to protect the integrity of copyright management 
information (CMI).174 Under the act, CMI is information conveyed in 
connection with copies or displays of copyrighted works concerning the 
                                                                                                                           
 172. See, e.g., James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price 
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2007, 2013 (2000) 
(describing information dissemination as “efficient” because “marginal cost of 
information is zero”); Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property, and the Right to Deny, 68 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 675, 698 (1993) (noting “zero marginal cost associated with additional 
users” of information); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 
83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 1053–54 (2005) (suggesting marginal cost in information industry is 
“zero or close to it”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 
106 Yale L.J. 283, 292 (1996) (“[A]s a general rule, once a work is produced, the marginal 
cost of disseminating it to the public, whether in hard copy or electronically, approaches 
zero.”); Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 2083, 2116 (2009) (observing marginal cost of additional user of information is 
zero); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood 
Relation, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 635, 645–46 (2007) (“Once the fixed costs needed to create 
the first copy of a particular work have been incurred, any number of copies of the 
original can be made without reducing the supply available for additional copies.”). 
 173. Russell W. Jacobs, Copyright Fraud in the Internet Age: Copyright Management 
Information for Non-Digital Works Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 13 
Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 97, 146–47 (2011) (describing legal reforms amidst concerns 
of preserving authentic author attribution of digital works). 
 174. 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2012). 
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copyright ownership and other relevant data regarding rights.175 The act 
forbids potential infringers from falsifying, altering, or destroying CMI in 
certain conditions.176 The aim of the provision is to create a stable align-
ment between title information and intellectual property assets, by deter-
ring takers from attempting to destabilize the connection.177 
Finally, the state must provide special rules for situations when par-
ties’ incentives are expected to change. It may have to provide special 
protections for the validity of title information when the owner is insol-
vent or expected to be insolvent. As we noted previously in section II.C,178 
this is one of the central concerns of the laws of bankruptcy. Richard 
Epstein also notes the importance of registries in allowing creditors to 
give notice of their interests to third parties by registering security inter-
ests.179 While Epstein accurately describes the registry as protecting the 
interests of strangers, it might more accurately be described as protecting 
the interest of the creditor (here with the incentives of the owner) in pre-
serving the integrity of information against the interest of the owner 
(here with the incentives of the nonconsensual taker) in undermining 
the integrity of that information. 
2. Facilitating vs. Obstructing Transactions. — If and when the state 
decides to adopt a registry for a certain class of properties, it must con-
front the question of what legal effect to give to the registries. For some 
classes of property, the registry should be given the power to rewrite legal 
rights; it should be a “true” determinative registry that sweeps away 
inconsistent claims. But for other classes of property, collecting and pre-
senting the information should suffice. Traditionally, the debate about 
whether true registration is superior to recording has focused on the cost 
of true registries.180 We argue that the efficacy of registration depends in 
                                                                                                                           
 175. Id. § 1202(c)(3). 
 176. Id. § 1202(a)–(b). 
 177. It is vital to bear in mind that current intellectual property registries contain 
information about title to the intellectual property, rather than to any particular physical 
embodiment of it. For instance, a copyright registry will note that J.K. Rowling owns rights 
to the copyright in the Harry Potter novels, but it will not register ownership of each of the 
millions of printed copies of those books. The registry thus provides significantly less shel-
ter value for any given purchaser. 
 178. See supra section II.C (assessing incentives of debtors in bankruptcy context). 
 179. See Richard A. Epstein, Comment, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of 
Servitudes, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1353, 1355–57 (1981) (“[W]here recordation of an interest is 
properly filed, it binds all subsequent takers [because] [a]ctual notice typically is provided 
by, and properly may be inferred from, proper recordation.”). Epstein’s primary concern is 
servitudes and the rights of parties with lesser property interests than title, rather than 
security interests and creditors. However, the analysis is similar. 
 180. Compare Powell, supra note 73, at 40–53 (presenting comparison of costs of land 
transactions with and without title registration), with McDougal & Brabner-Smith, supra 
note 77, at 1138–43 (impugning on multiple grounds Powell’s comparison of relative costs 
of registration and title insurance). See generally Arruñada, Property as Economic 
Concept, supra note 44, at 121–25 (presenting expanded cost analysis of land transactions 
and arguing for necessity of registry system). 
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larger part on the anticipated facilitative and obstructive effects of the 
registry. 
As demonstrated earlier in Part I,181 registries can increase the value 
of property rights not only by facilitating lawful transactions, but also by 
obstructing illicit transactions. If registries do little more than transmit 
information, these two effects will always go hand in hand. As it is easier 
for owners to transact, it will be more difficult for involuntary takers to 
transact. However, when registries do more than merely convey informa-
tion—when they are “true” registries that sweep away claims that com-
pete with the registered ownership—they can produce facilitating and 
obstructive effects that work at cross-purposes. This is because “true” reg-
istries make it easier for buyers to rely on the registered state of title, no 
matter whether that registered information is the result of a voluntary 
and lawful transaction or if it resulted from an involuntary taking 
coupled with a registry error. If an involuntary taker manages to fool the 
registry into registering his title as good, a buyer may rely on his title over 
that of a competing owner who acquired title lawfully but failed to 
register her interest properly. When takers can benefit from registries as 
well, registries can facilitate rather than obstruct illicit transactions. 
Obviously, the reliability and security of the information obtained by 
the state is a central factor in identifying cases where the state’s giving 
determinative power to registries can be counterproductive. If the state 
can easily verify the verity of title information, it can reduce the likeli-
hood of potential buyers being hoodwinked by involuntary takers. At the 
same time, the facilitative power of determinative registries is greatest 
when private buyers in the marketplace have a difficult time themselves 
verifying title information. Thus, the state should choose to grant deter-
minative power to registries when it has a clear advantage over private 
actors in verifying information.182 
3. Comprehensiveness vs. Accuracy. — A final factor for the state to 
consider, when it adopts a registry of whatever type, is what rules the state 
must adopt specifying the kinds of information the registry will record 
and present. 
Consider a land sale. Should the registry present information about 
sales that are in process, or should it record only completed transactions? 
At what stage of payment or delivery of deed should the registry present 
a land sale as complete and subject to registration? Should registries 
present information about mortgages or liens? To what degree should 
the registry demand proof of lack of encumbrances before recording a 
transfer? Should, for instance, all the neighbors be required to certify a 
lack of potential nuisance claims before a land transfer can be recorded? 
                                                                                                                           
 181. See supra Part I (setting forth functions of property registries). 
 182. This same basic tradeoff appears in other contexts as well, such as the question of 
the rights a bona fide purchaser ought to acquire to goods purchased in the market with 
defective title. 
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Each of these procedural questions demands separate analysis, but 
the central set of concerns presented by each is the same. Greater infor-
mational demands by the registry ensure better and more verifiable 
information, and, hence, a registry that better facilitates voluntary trans-
actions and foils involuntary ones. At the same time, greater informa-
tional demands increase the cost of using the registry, and thus threaten 
to drive transactions partially or completely outside the registry system. 
At the extreme, a registry can have such demanding rules that it never 
errs in providing information, but has almost no registered properties 
because almost no owners can comply with the informational demands. 
An example can help illustrate the tradeoff. Consider a state with a 
Torrens system of land registration with fairly demanding procedural 
rules for demonstrating that a transaction has taken place. On the one 
hand, this can create a high degree of confidence in land sales that 
involve the sale of fully registered rights. On the other hand, the system 
will create a registry that under-records many transactions which do not 
meet its demanding procedures. The result will be numerous transac-
tions that are genuine, but which lack and may never acquire the neces-
sary prerequisites for registration. 
The right balance between accuracy and comprehensiveness is diffi-
cult to specify in the abstract. A high degree of accuracy may compensate 
for the lack of comprehensiveness. In addition, transacting parties can 
protect themselves by recording title information through other means. 
For instance, land sales might be recorded by private entities pending 
“official” recordation in the land registry.183 While such alternative recor-
dations lack the determinative power of the official registry, they would 
help transacting parties verify much of the title information that is lack-
ing in the official registry. 
CONCLUSION 
Information is a crucial aspect of any property system. The informa-
tion contained in registries can dramatically enhance the value of prop-
erty rights in our society. Furthermore, registries often constitute the 
most effective way to protect the rights of owners. Notwithstanding their 
importance, registries are rarely discussed by property theorists. In this 
Essay, we have sought to illuminate the dual role registries play in the 
property world. Like the Roman god Janus, registries have two faces. 
They simultaneously perform a facilitative role by streamlining transac-
tions between willing sellers and buyers, and an obstructive role by hin-
dering nonconsensual deprivations of assets. As this Essay shows, both 
                                                                                                                           
 183. Robert E. Dordan, Comment, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), 
Its Recent Legal Battles, and the Chance for a Peaceful Existence, 12 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 
177, 177–80 (2010) (discussing nuances of similar privatized system, MERS, in field of 
recordation of mortgages, and possible reforms to improve its notice functionality). 
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effects should be taken into account by policymakers, who must ensure 
that registries are optimally designed to perform both roles. 
This Essay also demonstrates, contra conventional wisdom, that per-
fect information about assets may be welfare diminishing, as it may 
prompt nonconsensual takers to destroy, dismember, and reconfigure 
assets in order to make them unrecognizable and thereby drive a wedge 
between the description of the asset in the registry and its state in the 
real world. More generally, we have shown that the main goal of registries 
should not be to offer perfect information about assets and rights, but 
rather to ensure a stable fit between the information in the registry and 
the relevant asset covered. 
This important insight enables the rethinking of the conditions un-
der which registries would function optimally. In addressing this ques-
tion, prior scholarship focused exclusively on the cost of collecting and 
updating the data and the benefits from the registry. Our analysis shows 
that this view only captures the tip of the iceberg. It fails to take account 
of the effect of registries on the primary behavior of property owners and 
third parties and the various strategies they will adopt in the presence of 
right registries. Applying these insights, this Essay lists the assets and 
rights for which registries will function well and delineates the limits of 
registries. 
In a sense, registries are the dark matter of the property universe. 
Their existence is vital to our understanding of the property system, but 
we know precious little about them. In this Essay, we have sought to shed 
light on the phenomenon of registries in order to advance our under-
standing of the operation of property systems and, in particular, the 
informational environment that optimizes the workings of property law. 
 
